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Airplanes are a modern necessity of life, which allow for quick and
convenient transportation across the globe.  A staggering number of
people fly every year.1  In 2016 alone, U.S. based airline carriers en-
planed over 821.8 million passengers.2  Although air travel is a feature
of present day life, it is not without its issues.3  One of these issues is
the threat to human health by the transfer of communicable diseases
on airplanes.4  Think of it this way: Passengers from all walks of life,
some sick and some healthy, are enclosed in a small space5 and are
breathing the same recycled air.6  It should be no surprise that individ-
1. See generally Passengers All Carriers–All Airports, U.S. DEP’T TRANS., https://
www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.asp–?Data=1 (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
2. Id.
3. See Christopher Sanford, Air Travel, MERCK MANUAL, http://www.merckmanuals.com/pro
fessional/special-subjects/medical-aspects-of-travel/air-travel (last updated Jan. 2017).
4. See Petra A. Illig et al., Conveyance & Transportation Issues: Air Travel, in THE YELLOW
BOOK: CDC HEALTH INFORMATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 2016 ch. 6 (2016), http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2016/conveyance-transportation-issues/air-travel (“Communi-
cable diseases may be transmitted to other travelers during air travel.”); Melanie Haiken, Planes
Can Harbor Deadly Germs for 7 Days, Study Shows, FORBES (May 20, 2014, 5:55 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/melaniehaiken/2014/05/20/deadly-bacteria-can-live-for-a-week-on-planes-
study-shows/#2f600d6e7f82 (explaining one study of a Delta Airlines plane found bacteria on
plane surfaces can survive up to a week—MRSA survived 7 days and E. coli bacteria survived 4
days).  Further, in spring 2009, Vice President Joe Biden fueled concerns regarding transmission
of disease in airplane cabins by advising individuals “to avoid confined spaces such as airplanes
for the fear of contracting the flu [H1N1] from a sneezing passenger.”  Hugo Martin, Swine Flu
Outbreak Revives Fears About Air Quality in Planes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2009), http://articles.la
times.com/2009/oct/17/business/fi-briefcase17.
5. “An aeroplane [sic] cabin provides the smallest volume of available air per person of any
public space.”  David Ozonoff & Louis Pepper, Ticket to Ride: Spreading Germs a Mile High,
365 LANCET 917, 917 (2005).
6. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, International Responsibility in Preventing the Spread of Communi-
cable Diseases Through Air Carriage—The SARS Crisis, 30 TRANS. L.J. 53, 55 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Abeyratne, International Responsibility].
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uals routinely become ill while flying7—in fact, there dozens of arti-
cles on how to avoid just that.8
Communicable diseases, which are viruses that invade the human
body and cause an infection,9 include measles, chicken pox, polio,
hepatitis, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), norovirus, legionnaires, e. coli, Ebola,
influenza, tuberculosis, just to name a few.10  Historically, communica-
ble disease threats are not unique; for example, the bubonic plague
impacted millions of people around the world and can still be found in
Africa, Asia, and South America.11  As recently as early 2003, an in-
ternational severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak,
which originated from a Chinese doctor who treated patients with
symptoms of the disease and later boarded an airplane, resulted in
8,422 SARS cases and 916 deaths worldwide.12  In 2009, the world
faced the H1N1 swine flu pandemic,13 which infected individuals in
more than 213 countries14 and caused at least 16,713 deaths.15  While
many have thought communicable disease outbreaks were an issue of
the past, these recent outbreaks have shown the vulnerability of mod-
ern society.  The U.S. government attempts to mitigate the spread of
communicable diseases via air travel through the Do Not Board
(DNB) list, which prevents individuals who pose a risk of spreading an
7. See Scott McCartney, Where Germs Lurk on Planes; What to Do When Stuck at 30,000 Feet
Next to Sneezers and Coughers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204058404577108420985863872 (noting that a study found 20% increased risk
in catching a cold while flying).
8. See, e.g., Talia Avakian, 13 Tips to Avoid Getting Sick on a Flight, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8,
2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-avoid-getting-sick-on-a-plane-2015-8C; McCart-
ney, supra note 7; Tony Merevick, The Easiest Ways to Avoid Catching a Cold When You Fly, R
THRILLIST (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.thrillist.com/news/nation/the-easiest-ways-to-avoid-
catching-a-cold-when-you-fly; Claiborne Ray, How Not to Catch a Cold on a Plane, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/science/how-not-to-catch-a-cold-on-a-
plane.html?_r=0.
9. 3 LOUISE J. GORDY & ROSCOE N. GRAY, ATTORNEY TEXTBOOK oF MEDICINE § 33.40 (3d
ed. 2015).
10. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 2500(j) (2016).
11. Jatin Vyas, Plague, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MEDICE (Mar. 9, 2017), https://medlineplus.gov/ency/
article/000596.htm.
12. Courtney Clegg, Comment, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable
Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 440 (2010).
13. MyLinda K. Sims, When Pigs Fly: Does the ADA Cover Individuals with Communicable
Diseases Such as Novel H1N1 Influenza, “Swine Flu”?, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 463, 471 (2010).
14. DAVID A. RELMAN ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA A PANDEMIC: GLOBAL CHALLENGES,
GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK
52792/pdf/Bookshelf_ NBK52792.pdf.
15. Id. at 22.
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illness during travel from boarding a commercial flight.16  The DNB,
however, has not been as useful as it could be.17
Despite regulation at the international, federal, and state levels,
communicable disease outbreaks frequently make news headlines.18
After the news story breaks, an individual is left wondering what hap-
pened to the passengers who contracted the disease from the infected
passenger who boarded the plane?  Communicable diseases have the
potential to require extensive medical intervention, which translates
into expensive medical bills and lost wages, and can be life
threatening.19
This Comment argues that the United States should increase sur-
veillance and monitoring of communicable diseases through a com-
bined effort between the federal government, medical professionals,
and airline companies to implement the proposed “Communicable
Disease No-Fly Database” (hereinafter the “No-Fly Database”) to
update and replace the existing DNB list.  The proposed No-Fly
Database”) will maintain a routinely updated list of individuals with
confirmed communicable disease diagnoses.  Physicians will place any
individual diagnosed with a qualifying communicable disease on the
No-Fly Database.  Any individual placed in the No-Fly Database will
be recognized as infected with a contagious communicable disease
that poses a public health threat and will be denied the right to board
the aircraft.  The No-Fly Database will be cross-referenced with the
flight manifest at the time of check-in.  The increased supervision will
effectively prevent infected individuals from boarding the plane, thus
decreasing the risk of disease transmission onboard.
Furthermore, this Comment argues that an infected passenger who
knows or reasonably should know that he is ill and transmits his or her
illness to another passenger should be held civilly liable for injuries
sustained by the harmed passenger.  “The health of the public is an-
other shared value.  Not only does each individual have an interest in
staying healthy but also all of together share an interest in having a
16. Questions and Answers About the Federal Register Notice: Criteria for Recommending Fed-
eral Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/qas-frn-
travel-restriction.html; see infra notes 83–89 & 202–23. R
17. See infra notes 202–23. R
18. See, e.g., Peter Elkind, How Ice Cream Maker Blue Bell Blew It, FORTUNE (Sept. 25, 2015,
12:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/25/blue-bell-listeria-recall/; Maggie Fox, Exclusive: Patient
with Extreme Form of TB Sent to NIH, NBC NEWS (Jun. 9, 2015, 7:38 AM), http://
www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/exclusive-patient-extreme-form-tb-sent-nih-n371806.
19. See AON RISK SERVS., INFECTIOUS DISEASES IN THE WORKPLACE: “PEOPLE AT RISK” 2–7
(2008), http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/risk-services/infec-
tious_disease_in_the_workplace.pdf.
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healthy population.”20  Individuals owe a duty to society to reasonably
prevent the spread of communicable diseases.  When an individual
acts with reckless disregard for the safety of society, for example, by
boarding a plane when he knows that he has a rare, highly contagious
form of pneumonia, that individual has violated his duty.  Thus far,
caselaw does not answer the question of whether contracting a com-
municable disease during a flight constitutes an injury.21  Therefore,
creating this cause of action will incentivize individuals to be more
cautious when they know or suspect that they have contracted a com-
municable disease because liability would be a potential consequence
for the spread of the disease.
Part II of this Comment addresses (1) how communicable diseases
spread and (2) the legal framework for combatting communicable dis-
eases generally in the community, as well as in air travel.22  This Part
develops an understanding of the federal and state regulations cur-
rently in place.23  Part III of this Comment analyzes why the surveil-
lance systems, as well as airline monitoring mechanisms, currently in
place are inadequate to prevent infected individuals from boarding
planes and, therefore, spreading the disease to other passengers.24
This Part proposes two solutions: (1) a No-Fly Database for infected
individuals, and (2) a cause of action for passengers infected during
the flight.  Part IV of this Comment addresses the impact that the
database and new cause of action are likely to have on society, and
why both implementations are necessary.25  Finally, Part V concludes
the importance of the proposed solutions discussed in this Comment.
Ultimately, communicable diseases, which can be life threatening, are
easily spread via air travel, so the law should prevent infected individ-
uals from recklessly exposing other passengers to disease.
II. BACKGROUND
Before addressing how the United States can improve its disease
prevention via air travel, it is necessary to understand the existing pre-
vention infrastructure.  This Part explains what communicable dis-
20. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 20 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 2007).
21. N. Pieter M. O’Leary, Cock-A-Doodle Doo: Pandemic Avian Influenza and the Legal
Preparation and Consequences of an H5N1 Influenza Outbreak, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 511, 532
(2006).
22. See infra notes 28–132 and accompanying text. R
23. As this Comment does not focus on an international solution, Part II only briefly discusses
the international regulations.
24. See infra notes 133–332 and accompanying text. R
25. See infra notes 333–404 and accompanying text. R
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eases are and how they spread via air travel, thus highlighting the
severity of the problem.26  This Part also addresses the international,
federal, and state legal framework for generally combatting the spread
of communicable diseases, as well as how each level of government
addresses disease prevention in air travel.27
A. How Do Communicable Diseases Spread?
In short, a communicable disease is a virus that invades the human
body, causing an infection.28  Communicable diseases can spread
through a number of ways, including: (1) direct or indirect contact
with another person; (2) aerosolized particles or droplets in the air; (3)
bodily fluids; (4) solid objects; and (5) contaminated food and water.29
Some communicable diseases are spread when an infected person
speaks, coughs, or sneezes, as small droplets containing the disease
spread into the air.30  Depending on the droplet size, it may travel a
long distance (aerosol),31 or short distance (droplets),32 and may be
inhaled by another person.  Communicable diseases can also spread
through direct bodily contact when the skin of the infected individual
comes into contact with another person’s skin, or through indirect
bodily contact when an individual’s skin comes into contact with a
contaminated object or surface.33  Direct contact and aerosolized dis-
persion are the key modes of transmission for diseases such as tuber-
culosis, SARS, and influenza.34  The airplane cabin environment, in
which many people are crammed together, facilitates these methods
of transmission.
Airplane cabins necessarily lack fresh air, so the air becomes stale
from continuous recycling.35  Additionally, once the recycled air in the
airplane cabin becomes stale, the chance of removing droplets from
26. See infra notes 28–45 and accompanying text. R
27. See infra notes 46–132 and accompanying text. R
28. Londe, supra note 9, § 33.40. R




31. Id. (including chickenpox, measles, and tuberculosis).
32. Id. (including the common cold, influenza, meningococcal disease, and rubella).
33. Id. (including chickenpox, herpes, conjunctivitis, head lice, ringworm, scabies, warts, and
impetigo spread through direct or indirect bodily contact).
34. Y. Li et al., Role of Ventilation in Airborne Transmission of Infectious Agents in the Built
Environment—A Multidisciplinary Systematic Review, 17 INDOOR AIR 2, 5 (2007); see also
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis in the Aircraft Cabin-Issues of Air Carrier
Liability, 27 TRANS. L.J. 41, 42 (2000) [hereinafter Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis].
35. Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis, supra note 34, at 44. R
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the air, which is usually accomplished by fresh air, becomes remote.36
Because droplets in the air typically induce the spread of communica-
ble disease, the inability to remove the droplets in recycled airplane
air increases the chances of communicable diseases transmittal to pas-
sengers.37  Notably, large commercial aircrafts typically recirculate
fifty percent of the air delivered to passengers.38  The recirculated air
passes through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters before
being re-introduced to the cabin.39  The filters are designed to capture
dust, vapors, and bacteria.40  The standard of efficiency by which
HEPA filters are measured is the rate at which a filter removes 0.3
micron-diameter particles.41  Viruses range in size from 0.01 to .3 mi-
crons, so consequently, many viruses are outside of the optimal-zone-
for-capture by a HEPA filter.42  Further, the air filtration system can-
not protect passengers who “are seated within a few feet of a cough-
ing, sneezing, virus-spewing passenger.”43  Due to the ease with which
communicable diseases can spread, communicable diseases have
earned the old maxim, “diseases know no borders.”44  This saying is
even more true when applied to air travel,45 thus it is necessary for
governments to develop infrastructure to help prevent disease trans-
mission via air travel.
B. Legal Framework for Communicable Disease Prevention
in Air Travel
Given the perilous nature of communicable diseases, governments
and international organizations around the world have promulgated
procedures and regulations to prevent the spread of disease.46  This
36. Id.
37. Id. at 44.  Martin Hocking, a chemist at the University of Victoria in Canada, “determined
that airplane passenger transmission rates for colds were found to be 113 times the normal
ground level transmission rates . . . [due to] dry cabin air . . . .  The lack of humidity in the
airplane cabin allegedly prevents the proper functioning of the nature human defense system in
fighting viruses and bacteria.”  Clegg, supra note 12, at 452. R
38. Alexandra Mangili & Mark A. Gendreau, Transmission of Infectious Diseases During
Commercial Air Travel, 365 LANCET 989, 989 (2005).
39. Id. at 989–90.
40. Id. at 990.
41. James D. Miller, Defensive Filtration, ASHREA J., Dec. 2002, at 18, 22.
42. Id. at 18.  As a point of reference for how small viruses truly are, “the period at the end of
this sentence is approximately 300 microns in diameter.” Id.
43. Martin, supra note 4. R
44. See generally CDC Works 24/7 Around the Globe Because Diseases Know No Borders,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/about/pdf/facts/cdcfastfacts/
global-health-impact-factsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
45. See Mangili & Gendreau, supra note 38, at 989. R
46. See Obijiofor Aginam, International Law and Communicable Diseases, 80 BULL. W.H.O.
946, 947 (2002), http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/80(12)946.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL405.txt unknown Seq: 7 21-SEP-17 7:20
2017] PLEASE EXPECT TURBULENCE 1087
Part addresses the framework of the international, federal, and state
legal efforts to combat the spread of communicable diseases.
1. International Health Regulations47
The International Health Regulations (IHR) are a set of voluntary
principles that legally bind World Health Organization (WHO) mem-
ber states48 and attempt to create norms for handling medical and
health issues.49  The IHR require that aircrafts be disinfected, decon-
taminated, and de-ratted in order to ensure safe, sanitary conditions
during travel.50  It also allows member states to require medical docu-
mentation, such as an international certificate of vaccination,51 from
passengers prior to entry into the state.52  In the event that a traveler
is suspected of carrying a disease, the receiving state may hold the
passenger for non-invasive tests, observation, quarantine, medical
treatment, or altogether deny the passenger entry to the state.53  The
IHR are similar to the United States’ federal regulations for control-
ling communicable diseases.
2. Federal Regulation to Prevent Spread of Communicable Diseases
The United States government, at both the federal and state level,
has the duty to prevent the spread of communicable disease, as public
health is vital for a flourishing society.54  The federal government sat-
isfies its duty primarily through the power to impose quarantines55 for
47. As this Comment does not focus on the international aspect of communicable diseases in
air travel, only a short description of the international regulations will be offered to provide
useful context to the international problem.
48. The WHO is a specialized agency within the United Nations whose primary role is to
direct and coordinate international health. About WHO, W.H.O., http://www.who.int/about/en/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  The WHO consists of 194 member states, including the United States.
Countries, W.H.O., http://www.who.int/countries/en/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
49. See INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS art. 2 (W.H.O. 2005), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/43883/1/9789241580410_eng.pdf; see also Alexandra R. Harrington, Germs on a Plane!:
Legal Protections Afforded to International Air Travelers and Governments in the Event of a
Suspected or Actual Contagious Passenger and Proposals to Strengthen Them, 22 J.L. & HEALTH
295, 304 (2009).
50. INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS art. 22.  Although the IHR requires aircrafts to be disin-
fected and decontaminated, the IHR is silent as to frequency at which this must occur. Id.
51. Id. art. 2.
52. Id. art. 31.
53. Id. art. 18.
54. What Is Public Health?, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASSOC., https://www.apha.org/what-is-public-
health (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
55. Quarantine is different from isolation.  Quarantine separates and restricts the movement
of healthy persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease, but do not show
symptoms, while isolation restricts the movement of ill persons by separating them from those
who are well. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FACT SHEET: LEGAL AUTHORI-
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interstate and foreign traffic,56 and providing support and guidance to
the states through various federal agencies.57  The traditional role of
public health agencies is to exercise discrete powers58 such as injury
prevention,59 surveillance,60 and infectious disease control.61  This
subpart explains (1) the federal power to quarantine, and (2) details
the ways in which the federal government provides support and gui-
dance to state communicable disease prevention efforts.
a. The Federal Power to Quarantine
Quarantine, an early method of disease prevention, was utilized
under English common law, which recognized the right of the state to
limit the movement of infected individuals.62  The American colonies
adopted the English law, imposing quarantines as early as 1647.63
Early American courts considered public health a fundamental state
duty:
It is a well-recognized principle that it is one of the first duties of a
state to take all necessary steps for the promotion and protection of
the health and comfort of its inhabitants. The preservation of the
public health is universally conceded to be one of the duties devolv-
ing upon the state as a sovereignty . . . .64
While the power to quarantine largely falls under the state police
power, the federal government has the authority to quarantine as
well.65  The federal government’s power to quarantine expanded as
TIES FOR ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdf/legal-authori
ties-isolation-quarantine.pdf.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–272 (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 70–71 (2016).
57. Lea Ann Fracasso, Comment, Developing Immunity: The Challenges in Mandating Vac-
cinations in the Wake of a Biological Terrorist Attack, 13 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 15
(2010).  These agencies include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Na-
tional Institutes of Health, which operate under the auspices of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services. Id. at 16.
58. Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 39 (2008).
59. Federal health agencies prevent injuries by ensuring consumers use safe products. Id.
60. Federal health agencies conduct surveillance through screening and reporting. Id.
61. Federal health agencies control infectious diseases through vaccination, partner notifica-
tion, and quarantine. Id.
62. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161–62 (discussing
the state’s right to confine infected individuals in their home or aboard arriving ships for forty
days).
63. RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 1798–1950,
at 64–65 (1951).
64. Application of Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1966) (citing Lausen v. Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 214 N.W. 682, 684 (1927)).
65. Margaret M. Corley, Comment, Disease or Deprivation: The State’s Authority to Quaran-
tine, Depriving the Individual of His Constitutional Liberty, in the Shadow of H1N1, Apr. 2010, at
22.
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the result of the 1893 decision out of the Western District of Michigan,
Minneapolis, Saint Paul v. Milner,66 in which the Court allowed the
federal government to impose restrictions on immigration as part of
efforts to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.67
Since then, Congress has increased the federal government’s ability
to enforce quarantine laws without deference to state law68 through
the enactment of Title 42, section 264 of the United States Code.69
This section enables the Surgeon General, with the approval of the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), to make and enforce
regulations that she believes “are necessary to prevent the introduc-
tion, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.”70  The Secre-
tary of HHS, in consultation with the Surgeon General, may
recommend that the President apprehend or detain individuals for the
purpose of preventing the spread of communicable diseases.71
Through these Executive Orders, the federal government determines
when it may apprehend or detain individuals infected with specific dis-
eases.72  For example, in April 2005, President George W. Bush signed
Executive Order 13,375 to include “influenza caused by novel or
reemergent influenza viruses” as a quarantinable disease.73  Addition-
ally, Title 42 of the United States Code allows the Surgeon General to
require bills of health for air navigation and aircrafts.74  The federal
quarantine power enables the federal government to act on its own;
however, the federal government often acts in conjunction with the
states by providing support and guidance.
b. Federal Support and Guidance for State Prevention Efforts
By way of guidance and support, HHS handles the majority of fed-
eral health planning and policy, and it tasks the umbrella agencies, the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), with researching and developing policies
for disease prevention.75  HHS is authorized to collect morbidity data
66. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. v. Milner, 57 F. 276 (W.D. Mich. 1893) (per curiam).
67. Id.  The state maintained the power to detain passengers from uninfected countries de-
spite the inconvenience resulting to the emigrants. Id.
68. Katherine Vanderhook, A History of Federal Control of Communicable Diseases: Section
361 of the Public Health Service Act 38 (2002) (unpublished Third Year Paper, Harvard Law
School), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8852098/vanderhook2.pdf?sequence=2.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
70. Id. § 264(a).
71. Id. § 264(b).
72. Id.
73. Exec. Order 13, 375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 1, 2005).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 270 (2012).
75. Fracasso, supra note 57, at 16. R
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from state and local public health authorities throughout the United
States for use in quarantine measures.76  The CDC tabulates and dis-
seminates morbidity data collected from the states77 via the National
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS).78  The NNDSS is a
nationwide collaboration that enables all levels of public health agen-
cies to share disease related health information in order to monitor,
control, and prevent the occurrence and spread of communicable dis-
eases.79  The NNDSS utilizes the disease-surveillance data80 to iden-
tify and track cases of disease.81  This capability allows the NNDSS to
determine appropriate interventions to limit the spread and severity
of the disease.82
In addition to tabulating and tracking disease information, the
CDC, in conjunction with the United States Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), manage the public health do not board list (DNB).83
The DNB list may prevent individuals from boarding an aircraft that
has a point of origin or final destination within the United States, thus
restricting international and domestic travel.84  Once public health au-
thorities determine that an individual meets one of the four qualifying
criteria85 for placement on the DNB list, the individual is not permit-
76. Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by Clinicians, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION MMWR RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS, June 22, 1990.
77. Morbidity measures the prevalence of an illness in a population. See Basic Statistics:
About Incidence, Prevalence, Morbidity, and Mortality – Statistics Teaching Tools, N.Y. DEP’T
HEALTH (Apr. 1999), https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/chronic/basicstat.htm.
78. Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by Clinicians, supra note 76.  The NNDSS is a R
“passive surveillance system” that reports on all diseases under national surveillance.  Sandra W.
Roush, Enhancing Surveillance, in MANUAL FOR THE SURVEILLANCE OF VACCINE-PREVENTA-
BLE DISEASES 19-1 (5th ed. 2011).
79. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nndss/ [hereinafter NNDSS].
80. Disease surveillance data is dependent on complete and accurate reporting. See Roush,
supra note 78, at 19-1.  Detailed and accurate clinical information, such as the date that symp- R
toms presented, symptoms duration, and laboratory results, can be aggregated by disease to
study the disease trends, incidence, and prevalence. Id. at 19-2.
81. NNDSS, supra note 79. R
82. Id.
83. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes—United States, June 2007—
May 2008, 57 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 1009, 1009 (2008).  The creation of the DNB list is authorized pursuant the Public Health
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 264–265 (2012). See 80 Fed. Reg. 16,400–01 (Mar. 27, 2015).
84. Questions and Answers About the Federal Register Notice, supra note 16. R
85. To be placed on the DNB,
a person must: (1) be known or believed to be infectious with, or at risk for a serious
contagious disease that poses a public health threat to others during travel; and (2) not
be aware of his or her diagnosis, have been told about the diagnosis and not be follow-
ing public health recommendations, or be unable to be located; or (3) be likely to travel
on a commercial airplane into, through, or from the United States or travel internation-
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ted to fly until he or she is no longer contagious.86  The DNB is typi-
cally used to prevent individuals with contagious tuberculosis,
measles, and Ebola from boarding planes;87 however, individuals with
other communicable diseases may be prohibited from flying.88  The
analysis of the DNB list in Part III compares the existing federal
mechanism to Alexandra Harrington’s no-fly list and the proposed
No-Fly Database.  Beyond these few federal mechanisms, the federal
government leaves issues of public health largely to the states, which
utilize varied models to enforce public health laws.89
3. State Regulation to Prevent the Spread of Communicable
Diseases
State governments are tasked with safeguarding public health, while
the federal government provides guidance and support through multi-
ple federal agencies.90  Common to each state model is the desire to
bolster the prevention of communicable diseases.91  This subpart ad-
dresses (a) the mandatory reporting of communicable diseases; (b) the
state regulation of vaccinations; and (c) the state criminalization for
the willful transmission of a communicable disease.
a. Mandated Disease Reporting
Common to all state public health laws is the mandatory reporting
of communicable diseases to public health officers.92  There are slight
variations in the diseases to be reported, to whom the disease must be
reported, and the timeframe in which the report must be made.93  For
example, California requires every mandated reporter to immediately
report, within twenty-four hours to the state Department of Health
ally by any means; or (4) need to be placed on the DNB and Lookout list to respond to




88. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health, supra note 83 (noting that the “pub- R
lic health DNB list is not limited to those communicable diseases for which the federal govern-
ment can legally impose quarantine”).
89. Ariel R. Schwartz, Doubtful Duty: Physicians’ Legal Obligation to Treat During an Epi-
demic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657, 683 (2007) (stating that “the federal government’s role . . . is
primarily to advise and support state and local governments”).
90. Fracasso, supra note 57, at 15. R
91. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120130, 120175 (West 2015); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 2305/2–2.1 (2014); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-
C:7 (2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.042 (2015).
92. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text. R
93. Compare ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 690.200 (2015), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-
C:7, and TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.042.
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Services, every discovered, known, or suspected case of a communica-
ble disease.94  In comparison, New Hampshire only provides that if a
mandated reporter becomes aware that an individual is afflicted with
a communicable disease, then the mandated reporter must report to
the state Department of Health Commissioner.95  In the event that a
mandated reporter fails to report the disease, then the individual may
be guilty of a misdemeanor96 punishable, in some jurisdictions, by a
fine ranging from $50 to $1,000.97  The reported data is aggregated
and submitted to the CDC.98  The importance of mandatory reporting
cannot be understated because surveillance systems, such as the
NNDSS, depend upon this information.99  Many of the diseases upon
which the NNDSS conducts surveillance are preventable by vaccines;
however, as the next subpart will explain, diseases have the ability to
genetically mutate into new, stronger strains of the disease that neces-
sitate constant surveillance.
b. Vaccines: History and the Law
The development of vaccines100 to fight against life-threatening dis-
eases was a remarkable breakthrough in science, and has been consid-
ered one of the greatest medical advancements in the past hundred
years.101  This subpart provides a background for understanding how
vaccines prevent disease and how states prevent communicable dis-
eases through vaccination mandates.102
94. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120190.
95. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:7.
96. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §120295 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-C:21
(2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.049.
97. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §120295.
98. Mandatory Reporting of Infectious Diseases by Clinicians, supra note 76. R
99. W.H.O., COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE SYSTEM: GUIDE TO
MONITORING AND EVALUATING 2 (2006), http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/surveil
lance/WHO_CDS_EPR_LYO_2006_2.pdf.
100. Vaccines imitate an infection to teach the body how to defeat a particular virus so that
the body is left with a memory of how to fight the virus in the future. CTR. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, UNDERSTANDING HOW VACCINES WORK (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/vac
cines/hcp/conversations/downloads/vacsafe-understand-color-office.pdf.
101. Asif Doja, Genetics and the Myth of Vaccine Encephalopathy, PAEDIATRICS & CHILD
HEALTH, Sept. 2008, at 597.
102. This subpart does not focus on whether mandatory vaccination would resolve the issue of
communicable disease spread via air travel because it is too large of a topic to tackle in this
Comment.
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i. Vaccines “eradicated” communicable diseases
Infectious diseases were a leading cause of death until the beginning
of the twentieth century.103  Diseases such as smallpox, the bubonic
plague, polio, diphtheria, tuberculosis and measles claimed thousands
of lives.104  Today, the occurrence of many of these illnesses has drasti-
cally reduced due to the success of vaccinations.105  The benefits have
been remarkable, as millions of deaths have been prevented, millions
of lives have been improved, and billions of dollars of societal re-
sources have been saved for other uses.106  Vaccinations have been so
successful that decreased attention is paid to immunizations; this is
partially because most people alive today never saw the devastation
disease had on their ancestors.107
Although communicable diseases had been mostly eradicated
through the use of vaccinations and antibiotics, communicable dis-
eases have shown a tenacious ability to adapt, re-adapt, and survive by
mutating into a new pathogenic form for which the public generally
has no immunity.108  This phenomenon is known as diseases becoming
“drug resistant.”109  The “emergence of drug resistance in many orga-
nisms is reversing some of the therapeutic miracles of the last 50
years,”110 causing scientists to worry about these “new” communica-
ble diseases, as they have the potential for global reach and devasta-
103. Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999 Impact of Vaccines Recommended for Chil-
dren – United States, 1990–1998, 48 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 243, 243–44 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out
of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 362 (2004).
106. Id. at 369.
107. Id. at 362.
108. Peter N. Fonkwo, Pricing Infectious Disease, 9 EMBO REPS. S13, S13 (2008).  It is impor-
tant to note that antibiotics, which are medicines used to prevent and treat bacterial infections,
greatly reduced the rate of infection for many communicable diseases in the mid-1900s. Achieve-
ments in Public Health, 1900–1999: Control of Infectious Diseases, 48 CTR. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 621, 621–22 (1999). Such
widespread use of antibiotics has, however, led to antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic Resistance,
W.H.O. (Oct. 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/antibiotic-resistance/en/.  An-
tibiotic resistance makes it increasingly difficult to effectively treat infections because the bacte-
ria have adapted to antibiotics designed to kill them. Id.  For a more robust discussion of
antibiotic resistance, see generally C. Lee Ventola, The Antibiotic Resistance Crisis, 40 PHAR-
MACY & THERAPEUTICS 277 (Apr. 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4378521/.
109. Drug resistance is the “ability of microbes, such as bacteria [and] viruses . . . to grow in
the presence of a chemical (drug) that would normally kill it or limits its growth.” What Is Drug
Resistance?, NAT’L INST. ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Feb. 18, 2009), https://
www.niaid.nih.gov/research/what-drug-resistance.
110. AON RISK SERVS., INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 19, at 5. R
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tion.111  For example, the tuberculosis virus112 cannot be prevented by
vaccine and has genetically adapted to become multidrug-resistant113
and extensively drug-resistant114 to the traditional drugs used to treat
tuberculosis.115  These mutated viruses are essentially new diseases for
which individuals have no immunity or prior exposure via a vaccine;116
therefore, the mutated virus has the potential to trigger an
epidemic.117
Vaccinations clearly play a vital role in preventing the spread of
communicable diseases.  Due to their prominence in public health,
many state governments and the federal government have imple-
mented legal frameworks that regulate and mandate vaccinations.
ii. The Fundamentals of Vaccination Law
In the landmark case Jacobson v. Massachusetts,118 the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that state police power allowed states to protect
public health by requiring all citizens receive a smallpox vaccina-
111. Polly Price, Symposium: Teaching Public Health Law: Public Health Control Measures in
Response to Global Pandemics and Drug Resistance, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 50 (2015).
112. Tuberculosis is a commonly contracted disease that can have devastating effects, includ-
ing death. Infectious and Chronic Diseases, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/oes/
intlhealthbiodefense/id/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).  Tuberculosis spreads similarly to influenza
(i.e., through person-to-person contact). See Harrington, supra note 49, at 302.  A person with R
active tuberculosis can spread the disease by coughing, sneezing, or speaking.  Corley, supra note
65, at 26. R
113. Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis is caused by strains resistant to rifampicin and isoniazid,
two kinds of drugs used to treat tuberculosis.  Gunar Gunther, Multidrug-Resistant and Exten-
sively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: A Review of Current Concepts and Future Challenges, 14
CLINICAL MED. 279, 280 (2014).  Gunar Gunther, consultant physician for the Division of
Clinical Infectious Diseases at the Research Center Borstel in Borstel, Germany, notes that mul-
tidrug-resistant TB strains “are being actively transmitted from person to person with increasing
frequency.” Id. at 279.
114. Extensively drug resistant tuberculosis is a rare type of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
that is resistant to the most potent tuberculosis drugs—rifampicin, isoniazid, injectable agents
(i.e., amikacin, kanamycin, and capreomycin), and fluoroquinolones. Id. at 279–80.  The treat-
ment options for extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis are less effective and much more expen-
sive. See Fact Sheet: Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR TB), CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 4, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/factsheets/drtb/
xdrtb.htm.
115. See Drug Resistant TB, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/topic/drtb/.
116. Vaccine formulations must be updated for the virus strains; therefore, pharmaceutical
companies must essentially develop new vaccines every time a new virus strain arises. See Petra
Oyston & Karen Robinson, The Current Challenges for Vaccine Development, 61 J. MED.
MICROBIOLOGY 889, 890 (2012) (“[V]accines may be strain-specific, requiring a multivalent for-
mulation which is changed frequently.”).
117. What Would Happen If We Stopped Vaccination?, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION (May 19, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/whatifstop.htm.
118. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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tion.119  The defendant, Jacobson, claimed the Massachusetts law man-
dating smallpox vaccinations120 was an unreasonable invasion of his
person liberty.121  The Court acknowledged that individual liberty in-
terests prevent state intrusion in some instances, but individual rights
themselves cannot intrude upon other people’s rights as they pertain
to health.122  Thus, when health concerns of the larger community are
at stake, the state may infringe upon individual rights.123  Nearly two
decades following the Jacobson decision, in Zucht v. King,124 the U.S.
Supreme Court reiterated that the power to compel vaccination is
within the state’s policy power, by upholding the idea that a state may
exclude children from school for failing to present proof of vaccina-
tion.125  In both Jacobson and Zucht, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to interfere with the states’ police power unless the execution of such
power was unreasonable.126
Today, all fifty states have enacted compulsory vaccination laws,127
in part due to the health and welfare benefits made possible by vac-
cines.128  However, each state may determine the nature and strin-
gency129 of its vaccination laws.130  Illinois’ Communicable Disease
Prevention Act, section 315/1 states, “it is declared to be the public
policy of this State that all children shall be protected . . . by the ap-
propriate vaccines and immunizing procedures to prevent communica-
ble diseases . . . .”131  Despite regulation at the international, federal,
and state levels, communicable diseases continue to spread via air
119. Id. at 39.
120. Id. at 28–29.
121. Id. at 26.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
125. Id. at 177.
126. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28; Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176–77.
127. Calandrillo, supra note 105, at 381–82. R
128. Id. at 381.
129. Despite the benefits of vaccination mandates, many states provide exemptions for indi-
viduals who do not want to vaccinate.  Tara Sheoran, Note, Herding Immunity: Can Public
Health Fight Off Disease Using Canada’s Voluntary Vaccination System?, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 785, 794–95 (2012).  Many parents choose not to vaccinate their children for fear
that the vaccines do more harm than good. See Calandrillo, supra note 105, at 359.  Depending R
on which state law is conferred, individuals are granted vaccination exemptions for (1) medical
opposition; (2) religious opposition; and (3) non-religious moral or philosophic opposition.  She-
oran, supra note 129, at 794. R
130. Sheoran, supra note 129, at 786. R
131. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1 (2014).
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travel.132  The following proposed solutions will help prevent disease
transmission aboard an aircraft.
III. ANALYSIS
The problem with applying federal quarantine laws and state
criminalization statutes to air travel is the presumption that an out-
break will be readily observable and identifiable before or during air
travel.133  Public health law, broadly, is the authority for, and responsi-
bility of, organized society to ensure the optimal environment for the
population’s health.134  The law can empower innovative solutions via
seven models: “taxation and spending, alteration of the informational
environment, alteration of the built environment, alteration of the so-
cioeconomic environment, direct regulation, indirect regulation
through the tort system, and deregulation.”135
This Comment proposes two solutions to address the fragmented
system for controlling communicable disease transmission by utilizing
(1) direct regulation and (2) indirect regulation models.136  Part A
highlights the numerous incidents of communicable disease spread via
air travel and the toll such outbreaks have.137  Part B analyzes the
direct regulation methods utilized by the federal government and pro-
poses implementing the No-Fly Database to improve surveillance and
prevent further spread of communicable diseases.138  Part C analyzes
the indirect regulation through the tort system and advocates for im-
posing liability upon the individual who transmits a communicable dis-
ease to fellow passengers.139
132. It would be unrealistic to claim the solutions proposed in this Comment will totally pre-
vent disease transmission aboard an aircraft, but the author believes that the changes proposed
in this Comment will substantially decrease the risk of transmitting diseases by air travel.
133. Harrington, supra note 49, at 312. R
134. Erika Blacksher, Public Health Ethics, U. WASH. SCH. MEDICINE, https://depts.washing-
ton.edu/bioethx/topics/public.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2017).
135. Gostin, supra note 58, at 28–29. R
136. Id. at 29.  The informational environment may be altered by educating and encouraging
the public to make healthy choices through communication campaigns, requiring businesses to
properly label their products or government regulation of misleading information. Id. at 32.  The
built environment may be altered by reducing injury (e.g., workplace safety and fire codes),
communicable diseases (e.g., sanitation, zoning, housing codes), and environmental harms (e.g.,
lead paint and toxic emissions). Id. at 34.
137. See infra notes 140–73 and accompanying text. R
138. See infra notes 174–255 and accompanying text. R
139. See infra notes 256–332 and accompanying text. R
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A. Numerous Incidents of Communicable Disease Spread
Via Air Travel
In early 2003, the WHO announced the re-emergence of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).140  Within a few days of the out-
break, it became clear that the disease was spreading by air travel
along major airline routes.141  The outbreak began in China when an
infected physician traveled to Hong Kong.142  The physician stayed in
a hotel and subsequently infected at least sixteen hotel guests who
stayed on the same floor as the physician.143  Those guests returned
home and spread the disease to Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada.144
The passengers within three rows of the infected individuals were
most at risk.145  “On one flight, it was thought that one infected pas-
senger likely transmitted SARS to 22 out of 119 passengers on
board.”146  The outbreak resulted in 2,223 suspected cases in eighteen
countries.147
More recently, in April 2015, a woman infected with a highly drug
resistant form of tuberculosis flew from India to Chicago, Illinois.148
Upon arriving in Chicago, the woman traveled to Missouri, Tennessee,
and then returned to Chicago.149  She finally sought medical treatment
in Chicago, nearly seven weeks after landing in the United States.150
Perhaps the most memorable incident of a communicable disease
being transmitted through air travel occurred with the “tuberculosis
traveler” incident in May 2007.151  Andrew Speaker, a thirty-one-year-
old personal injury lawyer from Atlanta, Georgia, took several inter-
national flights while infected with a rare, highly drug-resistant form
of tuberculosis.152  Mr. Speaker was aware at the time of his flights




143. Id. at 74–75.
144. Clegg, supra note 12, at 440. R
145. Air Travel ‘Fuelled SARS Spread,’ BBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2003, 11:56 PM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3329483.stm.
146. Clegg, supra note 12, at 440. R
147. Abeyratne, International Responsibility, supra note 6, at 58. R
148. Denise Grady, Tuberculosis Case Prompts Search for Patient’s Fellow Passengers, N.Y.




151. U.S. Steps Up Precautions over TB, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2007, 9:21 PM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6706437.stm.
152. See id.; see also Eve Conant, TB Man Tells His Side of the Story, NEWSWEEK (May 31,
2007, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/tb-man-tells-his-side-story-100883.  Tuberculosis af-
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that he was infected with a rare form of tuberculosis, as he had been
diagnosed three months prior.153  Mr. Speaker’s local public health
agency informed him that traveling was against medical advice;154
however, Mr. Speaker did not believe he was sick enough to infect
others, so he disregarded public health officials’ warnings.155
While in Italy, Mr. Speaker’s diagnosis was altered to extensively
drug-resistant tuberculosis.156  United States health officials contacted
Mr. Speaker to inform him that he should not travel and that he
should voluntarily enter quarantine.157  Instead, he boarded the plane,
placing those around him at risk of contracting the rare, drug-resistant
form of tuberculosis, because he believed Italy’s tuberculosis treat-
ment would not be as effective as the treatment available in the
United States.158  The general consensus is that an airplane passenger
infected with tuberculosis, which is spread through the air,159 can
transmit the disease to passengers within three rows of his seat.160
Thus, “[w]henever Speaker coughed, spoke, laughed, or sneezed, he
released living virulent bacilli into the air, exposing other passengers
to infection.”161  Although no passengers contracted Mr. Speaker’s ex-
tensively drug-resistant tuberculosis, the event prompted public out-
cry against the actions of the tuberculosis traveler, who disregarded
the warnings of officials and placed fellow passengers at risk of con-
tracting the disease.162
fects individuals across a spectrum of severity.  Sims, supra note 13, at 477.  Mr. Speaker was R
infected with multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, which is a strain of tuberculosis that is resistant to
the first line drugs used to treat all persons with tuberculosis. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, TB ELIMINATION: MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCULOSIS (MDR TB) (June 7,
2012), http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/factsheets/drtb/mdrtb.pdf.
153. Conant, supra note 152. R
154. Hilary Fallow, Reforming Federal Quarantine Law in the Wake of Andrew Speaker: The
“Tuberculosis Traveler,” 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 83, 84 (2008).
155. Exclusive: TB Patient Asks for Forgiveness But Defends Travel, ABC NEWS, http://
abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/story?id=3231184&page=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) [hereinafter
Exclusive: TB Patient].  Mr. Speaker maintained that officials only advised, not ordered, him not
to travel.  Mike McPhee, Doubts on TB Patient’s Wedding, DENVER POST (June 1, 2007, 8:03
AM), http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_6037621.
156. Fallow, supra note 154, at 84.  Extensively drug resistant TB is a rare type of multidrug- R
resistant TB that is resistant to almost all drugs used to treat TB. See generally CTR. FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TB ELIMINATION: EXTENSIVELY DRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCU-
LOSIS (XRD TB) (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/factsheets/drtb/xdrtb.pdf.
157. Exclusive: TB Patient, supra note 155. R
158. Harrington, supra note 49, at 297. R
159. Fallow, supra note 154, at 83 R
160. Harrington, supra note 49, at 302. R
161. Fallow, supra note 154, at 83–84. R
162. Harrington, supra note 49, at 296. R
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Following this incident, tuberculosis has emerged as a perceived
public health hazard, especially because these incidents can have cata-
strophic consequences for any individual that contracts the disease.163
Drug-resistant tuberculosis comprises around 1.0–1.5% of all tubercu-
losis cases,164 and “requires lengthy regimens of toxic drugs, imposes
high costs on the health care system and society, and causes high mor-
tality rates.”165  Treatment for drug-resistant tuberculosis requires at
least two years of expensive medications and hospitalization for ap-
proximately 75% of patients.166  The average, direct cost of treating
non-drug-resistant tuberculosis is $17,000, while drug-resistant tuber-
culosis treatment costs between $134,000 and $430,000.167  Add in pro-
ductivity losses and the average drug-resistant tuberculosis treatment
costs between $226,000 and $554,000.168  Suzanne Marks, an epidemi-
ologist for the CDC’s Clinical and Health Systems Research
Branch,169 found that private insurance only covers 75% of benefi-
ciaries with drug-resistant tuberculosis for 80% of the costs.170  Fur-
ther, the resulting psychological consequences of contracting a
potentially deadly communicable disease are immense.  Patients in-
fected during the 2003 SARS outbreak reported emoting fear, denial,
and frustration.171  A patient’s anxiety can extend beyond the physical
consequences of contracting a communicable disease to the social
stigmatization.172
Clearly, contracting a rare form of tuberculosis—or any communi-
cable disease—has a significant impact on both the individual and so-
ciety.  Marks notes that prevention opportunities are limited, and
investment in disease control infrastructure, as well as the capacity to
prevent disease, is critical.173  The prevalence of disease transmission
via air travel and the impact that it can have necessitate stronger regu-
lation of the infected individuals’ conduct.
163. Id. at 301.
164. Suzanne Marks et al., Treatment Practices, Outcomes, and Costs of Multidrug-Resistant
and Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, United States 2005–2007, 20 EMERGING INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES 812, 812 (2014).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 818.
167. Id. at 817.
168. Id.
169. Suzanne Marks Worked with Village Woman, Turning Small Businesses into Success Sto-
ries for Entire Families, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
globalhealth/employment/suzanne-marks.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 2015).
170. Marks et al., supra note 164, at 817. R
171. G. Pappas et al., Psychological Consequences of Infectious Disease, 15 CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 8, at 744 (Aug. 2009).
172. Id.
173. Marks et al., supra note 164, at 817. R
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B. Direct Regulation for Preventing Communicable Disease
Transmission in Air Travel
The United States government has the power to directly regulate
individuals and businesses.174  “In a well-regulated society, public
health authorities set clear, enforceable rules to protect the health and
safety of workers, consumers, and the population at large.”175  The
regulation of an individual’s behavior, such as requiring passengers in
a car to wear seat belts or motorcyclists to wear a helmet, reduces
injuries and death.176  Regulating infected individuals’ conduct
through the no-fly list and through tort liability will reduce the num-
ber of individuals who contract a communicable disease.  Currently,
disease prevention in air travel is inadequate because (1) the division
of public health powers leads to uncoordinated approaches of han-
dling communicable disease prevention and control; (2) disease sur-
veillance conducted by airlines is ineffective; and (3) the current DNB
is a lengthy and ineffective method for preventing infected passenger
from flying.  To combat the fragmented system currently in place,
highly contagious individuals should be placed into the proposed spe-
cialized No-Fly Database.
1. Government Surveillance of Communicable Diseases
Governments are authorized to regulate public health.177  One of
the mechanisms utilized by the federal government to regulate public
health is surveillance systems178  designed to provide public health of-
ficials with sufficient information to prevent and combat the spread of
communicable diseases.179  Surveillance is the “systemic collection,
analysis and public health response to the occurrence of infectious dis-
ease conditions in our communities” and “encompasses both the re-
port and investigation of cases and the submission of clinical
specimens when needed for testing at a . . . public health labora-
tory.”180  Essentially, surveillance provides government officials with
data regarding when, where, and how a communicable disease out-
break occurred.181  The keys to treating and controlling communicable
174. Gostin, supra note 58, at 36. R
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Aginam, supra note 46, at 947. R
178. See Questions and Answers About the Federal Register Notice, supra note 16; see also R
Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health, supra note 83. R
179. David Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and Interna-
tional Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 827 (1997).
180. Id. at 823.
181. Id. at 827.
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disease are (1) identifying the agent, (2) understanding how the dis-
ease works, (3) ascertaining how the individual was initially infected,
and (4) identifying how the disease can be transmitted to other indi-
viduals.182  Without this information, it is nearly impossible to combat
or control communicable diseases.183
The United States utilizes the NNDSS as a surveillance system for
all levels of public health.184  Disease reporting conducted by the
states is submitted to the CDC for inclusion into the NNDSS.185  The
NNDSS compiles the data to monitor and prevent the spread of dis-
ease.186  Despite having a national communicable-disease surveillance
system, the structure of the federal government weakens the ability of
public health officials to act effectively.187  The federal government’s
power to prevent and respond to communicable diseases is limited
because states have the primary responsibility for communicable dis-
ease control.188  For example, while the CDC provides surveillance
data to state public health authorities, the CDC cannot respond to a
disease outbreak unless it is invited to do so by state authorities, and
the CDC cannot implement control and prevention measures outside
the quarantine power because those powers belong to the states.189
“The nature of the federal system and division of public health powers
provides an ‘increased likelihood of uncoordinated approaches’ to
multistate disease outbreaks.”190  This fragmented system creates a
breeding ground for miscommunication among agencies and between
the states and federal government.  The miscommunication between
vital actors in the public health arena leads to an uncoordinated initia-
tive that is not integrated among the actors and thus lacks universal
support.191  To further exacerbate the problem of ineffective preven-
tion, airlines fail to adequately monitor the health of their boarding
passengers.  Despite this shortcoming, the CDC’s extensive surveil-
182. Id. at 777.
183. Id.
184. See NNDSS, supra note 79. R
185. See National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) Data Collection and Re-
porting, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 6, 2015), https://wwwn.cdc.gov/
nndss/nedss.html.
186. NNDSS, supra note 79. R




191. See generally PATRICIA ORDONEZ DE PABLOS, GREEN TECHNOLOGIES AND BUSINESS
PRACTICES: AN IT APPROACH 37 (2013) (noting that “uncoordinated initiatives do not assist . . .
in gaining a competitive advantage, or make a meaningful strategic impact”).
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lance system for tracking communicable diseases could be extended to
prevent infected individuals from boarding airplanes.192
2. The Ineffectiveness of Airline Disease Monitoring
Transmission of communicable diseases has become a greater litiga-
tion risk for businesses because businesses are facing private plaintiffs
who have been injured.193  Incidents in which passengers disregard
their illness and thus place fellow passengers at risk raise concerns for
the airline industry regarding their potential liability in the event of a
communicable disease outbreak.194  Airlines must balance the safety
of their crew and passengers against the interests and rights of the
passenger traveling with the communicable disease.195  Under federal
regulations, pilots act as the “master of a vessel” in charge of a con-
veyance of interstate traffic, and have a duty to report any case or
suspicion of a communicable disease to local public health authori-
ties.196  Airline carriers may deny boarding, delay boarding, require a
medical certificate, or impose conditions on a passenger (such as
wearing a mask) if airline personnel believe the passenger with the
communicable disease poses a “direct threat” to the safety and health
of others.197
Airlines may be resistant to prevent passengers from boarding in
the event that their actions violate the Air Carrier Access Act, which
prohibits airlines from discriminating against a passenger with a disa-
bility.198  Although “disability” does not include an individual infected
with a communicable disease,199 airlines may be wary to deny board-
ing to an infected individual if there is possibility for discrimination
liability.  Despite the various statutes and regulations imposing moni-
toring requirements, airline monitoring is not as effective as it should
be given how frequently disease transmission aboard aircrafts oc-
192. The CDC already operates a do-not fly list. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public
Health Purposes, supra note 83.  This Comment argues that the system should be modified. R
193. Lindsay Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 209–10
(2012).
194. Judith R. Nemsick, Preventing Airline Liability for Spread of Communicable Diseases,
HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP (Dec. 2007), http://www.hklaw.com/publications/Preventing-Airline-
Liability-for-Spread-of-Communicable-Diseases-12-18-2007/.
195. Id.
196. 42 C.F.R. § 70.4 (2016).
197. 14 C.F.R. § 382.21 (2016).  A “direct threat” means “a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures,
or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”  14 C.F.R. § 382.3.
198. 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2012).
199. 14 C.F.R § 382.3.  A disability means “a physical or mental impairment that, on a perma-
nent or temporary basis, substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of
such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.” Id.
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cur.200  Therefore, a stronger prevention method must be imple-
mented to stop infected individuals from boarding aircrafts.
3. The “Communicable Disease No-Fly Database” as a Proposed
Solution
The United States should increase surveillance and monitoring of
airline passengers in order to prevent the spread of communicable dis-
ease.  To combat the fragmented system currently in place, through a
combined effort, the federal government and the airline companies
should place highly contagious individuals into the proposed, special-
ized No-Fly Database.  The proposed No-Fly Database is not a radical
idea or expansion of authority; no-fly lists already exist for other clas-
ses, such as suspected terrorists201 and individuals that pose a serious
threat to public health.202  Individuals with a communicable disease
are generally restricted under federal regulations from traveling from
one state to another during the contagion period.203  This No-Fly
Database would simply enforce this federal regulation; however, en-
forcement of the regulation via the DNB is ineffective and does not
pass muster, as evidenced by the numerous stories of communicable
diseases spreading via air travel since the DNB’s inception.  The pro-
posed No-Fly Database would cure the deficiencies of the current sys-
tem by streamlining the DNB list-placement process and simplify the
role of airlines by only requiring that they check boarding passengers
for DNB placement prior to boarding.
a. The Federal Do Not Board List
As previously stated, the CDC and DHS operate the DNB list for
individuals who pose a serious threat to public health;204 however, this
mechanism for preventing the spread of communicable diseases is in-
effective.  First, placement on the DNB list is a rather lengthy process.
It starts with a local or state public health authority notifying a CDC
200. See Infectious Diseases on Aircraft, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION, http://ec
dc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/ragida/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
201. Terrorist Screening Center, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/na
tional-security-branch/tsc (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
202. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83.  For example, R
the public health DNB is only been used for passengers with suspected or confirmed cases of
pulmonary tuberculosis. Id. Individuals infected with tuberculosis can transmit the virus
through the air and remains contagious for long periods of time. Id.
203. 42 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2015).
204. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
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Quarantine Station.205  Upon receipt of the notification, the CDC and
the local public health department collaborate on the case.206  If the
CDC concurs with the public health authority’s determination, then
the CDC officer approves the DNB placement request and forwards
this information to the CDC Emergency Operations Center.207  The
Emergency Operations Center then submits the request to the
HHS.208  HHS forwards the request to the Department of Homeland
Security, which notifies the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and the United States Customs and Border Protection
(CBP).209  In 2007, the CDC placed only thirty-three individuals on
the DNB list.210  The DNB list clearly does not reach its full potential
when compared to the current number of individuals on the no-fly list
for suspected terrorists (approximately 16,000).211  The federal DNB
list allows domestic and international health officials to request that
an individual, who meets specified criteria, be restricted from board-
ing a commercial flight departing from, or arriving in, the United
States.212
In order to place an individual on the DNB list and restrict him
from international travel, the individual must meet the following crite-
ria: (1) the individual is likely be contagious with a communicable dis-
ease that would pose a serious public health threat if the individual is
allowed to board the plane; (2) the individual is unaware of or will
likely not adhere to public health officials’ recommendations; and (3)
the individual is likely to attempt to board the plane.213  Once an indi-
vidual is placed on the DNB list, the airline company is instructed not
to issue a boarding pass to that individual.214  However, the federal
DNB model includes several steps before the airline ever receives that
information.215  First, the CDC complies the list of individuals re-
stricted from boarding an airplane.216  Then, the information is passed
205. See generally PETER HOUCK, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. PUBLIC






210. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
211. Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 201. R
212. Id.
213. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health, supra note 83. R
214. Id.
215. See Feds Maintain Public Health No-Fly List, WBRC FOX 6 NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015, 5:50
PM), http://www.wbrc.com/story/26797831/feds-maintain-public-health-no-fly-list.
216. Id.
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along to HHS, which in turn provides the list to the TSA.217  Next,
TSA shares the list with the airlines.218  Finally, the airline purposely
does not issue a boarding pass to individuals on the DNB list.219  The
individual is not removed from the list until public health officials de-
termine the individual is no longer contagious.220  The median length
of time an individual remains in the DNB is twenty-six days.221  Once
an individual receives medical confirmation that he is no longer conta-
gious, the individual is removed from the DNB list within ten222 to
twenty-four hours.223  A new model for preventing infected individu-
als from boarding aircrafts is necessary as the federal DNB list is tedi-
ous and ineffective.
b. Harrington’s No-Fly List
As an alternative to a federally operated DNB list, Alexandra Har-
rington, an attorney specializing in international law, suggested the
creation of an international do-not fly list maintained by the WHO.224
An individual would be placed on the internationally operated list if
(1) the individual received a confirmed diagnosis of a communicable
disease; (2) there is high suspicion that the individual has contracted a
communicable disease; or (3) the individual has lived in, traveled to,
or was otherwise in contact with an area of suspected or confirmed
disease outbreak.225  The individual’s physician or hospital doctors
would make the placement in the event that there is a confirmed or
suspected diagnosis;226 however, there is no procedure for placing an
individual on the no-fly list when the individual has been in contact
with an area of suspected or confirmed disease outbreak.227
Harrington suggests that the individual may only be removed from
the database when (1) a certified medical personnel determines the
individual is no longer infected with a disease; (2) the individual has
been successfully treated for the disease and is no longer contagious;
(3) the person demonstrates that he or she has not been in contact
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. HOUCK, supra note 205. R
223. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
224. Harrington, supra note 49, at 313. R
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The physician may ask the individual whether he or she has been in contact with any
areas of suspected or confirmed disease outbreak.  Then, the physician would be able to place
the individual on the no-fly list.
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with an area confirmed or suspected of an outbreak; and (4) the area
with which the individual had contact is no longer a site of an out-
break.228  While the extensive requirements for removal from the
database are comprehensive, undoubtedly to ensure the safety of fel-
low passengers, the requirements are overly burdensome and inhibit
an individual’s right to travel.
c. The Proposed Communicable Disease No-Fly Database
The proposed No Fly Database will cure the deficiencies of the fed-
eral DNB list and Harrington’s do-not fly list.  Like the federal DNB
list, the database will be maintained and operated by the CDC and
DHS,229 as both agencies have access to public health and public
threat information.230  Further, individuals placed on the list should be
restricted from air travel domestically, as well as internationally.231
The public health threat does not diminish simply because the individ-
ual is traveling throughout the United States.232
i. Diseases included on the No-Fly Database
The CDC will routinely publish and update a list of communicable
diseases for which a diagnosis would result in placement on the No-
Fly Database.233  The communicable diseases which warrant place-
ment in the No-Fly Database will not be limited to those for which the
federal government can legally impose isolation and quarantine;234
228. Id.
229. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83.  Although R
the DNB list should restrict domestic and international travel, this system will be unable to
monitor the travel of passengers coming to the United States from other countries.  International
travel arriving in the United States will have to be monitored by the departing country. Admit-
tedly, this is one of the strengths of Harrington’s model which is monitored by the WHO. See
Harrington, supra note 49, at 313. R
230. See generally Disease Surveillance and Monitoring, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/about/pdf/facts/cdcfastfacts/disease-surveillance-
factsheet.pdf; Preventing Terrorism Results, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (July 13, 2015), https://
www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results#.
231. While this Comment does not focus on the international aspect of communicable disease
spread via air travel, such a risk exists.  It would be imprudent and detrimental to international
public health to only restrict domestic air travel; however, this Comment does not address the
international aspect of the DNB.
232. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83 (“Persons R
with communicable diseases who travel on commercial aircraft can pose a risk for infection to
the traveling public.”).
233. States already publish lists of communicable diseases for which physicians must report a
diagnosis or suspected diagnosis depending upon the jurisdiction. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 2.1 (2016).
234. Under 42 U.S.C. § 264, the Secretary of HHS may apprehend, detain, or conditionally
release persons believed to be carrying communicable diseases specified in Executive Order as
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however, the federally quarantinable diseases may influence the
CDC’s decision on which diseases to include on the list.  Instead, the
predetermined diseases that warrant placement on a No-Fly
Database, will be those that pose a serious public health threat.235  In-
dividuals infected with illnesses of a smaller degree, such as the com-
mon cold or sinus infection, will not be subject to placement in the
No-Fly Database because these illnesses do not constitute a public
health threat.236  An individual will only be placed in the No-Fly
Database if he receives a confirmed diagnosis of a communicable dis-
ease for which the CDC has determined warrants a placement in the
No-Fly Database.  Such determination will be influenced by federal
quarantinable diseases list,237 as well as the disease-surveillance data
collected by the NNDSS.238  For example, diseases for which a diagno-
sis would result in placement in the No-Fly Database could be epi-
demic-prone diseases, such as cholera, yellow fever, Ebola, epidemic
meningococcal disease, SARS, or drug-resistant tuberculosis.239  Al-
though the Database will cast a wider net to prevent more infected
individuals from traveling via air, the Database raises concerns about
the deprivation of individuals’ rights.
ii. Individual liberty: primary concern
Limiting an individual’s liberty is a major concern for the imple-
mentation of the No-Fly Database; however, its effectiveness depends
on its ability to prevent infected individuals from traveling.  There-
fore, the No-Fly Database proposition limits the occasions for which
an individual must be placed in the No-Fly Database because it may
quarantinable.  Currently, the list of diseases eligible for isolation and/or quarantine include:
cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic
fevers (including Ebola and others not yet isolated or named), severe acute respiratory syn-
drome, and influenza. See Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 5, 2005), and Exec. Order No.
13,674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 (Aug. 6, 2014).
235. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
236. See generally W.H.O., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2007: A SAFER FUTURE–GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH THREATS IN THE 21ST CENTURY OVERVIEW 6–8 (2007), http://www.who.int/
whr/2007/chapter1/en/.  Illnesses that are not severe enough for which the government cannot
apprehend, detain, or conditionally release should not be a basis for placement on the no-fly list.
237. The federal government has previously determined that these diseases are public health
threats such that a suspected or confirmed case of a quarantinable disease warrants the depriva-
tion of individual freedom. See Paul Callan, Ebola Quarantine Is Perfectly Legal, CNN (Oct. 6,
2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/justice/callan-law-on-quarantine/.
238. The surveillance data will indicate which diseases are particularly contagious and likely to
spread easily via air travel. See NNDSS, supra note 79. R
239. See Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
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infringe on the individual liberty to choose how and when to travel.240
On the surface, restricting an individual’s ability to travel because the
individual has lived in or traveled to an area with a communicable
disease outbreak seems overly burdensome.  Further, by predetermin-
ing which diseases warrant placement in the No-Fly Database, Har-
rington and the government’s multiple qualifications for placement on
the no-fly list241 are no longer necessary.  The proposed No-Fly
Database simplifies this process.  If an individual is infected with a
disease that the CDC has identified as contagious, such that it poses a
serious health threat, the individual is automatically placed on the
list.242  Thus, unlike Harrington’s model, there is no need to consider
whether the individual will adhere to public health officials’ recom-
mendations, if the individual is likely to attempt to board a plane, or if
the individual has been in contact with an area with a confirmed dis-
ease outbreak in the placement determination.243  The qualifications
for placement on the DNB are clearly established, but it is important
to understand how this system will actually operate.
iii. A practical application of the proposed database
Upon diagnosis of a communicable disease, the treating physician
will submit the diagnosis to the No-Fly Database to automatically add
the individual to the No-Fly Database.244  The No-Fly Database will
be operated by software, which airlines will be able to access to auto-
matically cross-reference the No-Fly Database with the boarding pas-
senger at flight check-in.245  If any passenger checking in for a flight is
240. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (stating the constitutional right to travel is
“firmly embedded in our jurisprudence”).
241. Harrington, supra note 49, at 313; Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Pur- R
poses, supra note 83. R
242. To be sure, there will likely be misdiagnoses that result in placement on the DNB and
thus deprivation of individual liberty.  However, diagnostic technologies are continually improv-
ing. See Angela Caliendo et al., Better Tests, Better Care: Improved Diagnostics for Infectious
Diseases, 57 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S139, S144 (2013) (“We are at the beginning of a
significant transformation in diagnostics and it is critical to capitalize on the current opportunity
to invest in the most needed diagnostics and enable the utilization of improved diagnostics for
both clinical management and public health surveillance.”).  Thus, the incident rate for misdiag-
nosis resulting in placement on the DNB and deprivation of individual liberty will be continually
decreasing and the deprivation of that individual’s right to travel should be accommodated.
243. Harrington’s DNB model considers these circumstances when determining whether to
place an individual on the DNB list. See Harrington, supra note 49, at 313. R
244. See id.  Alexandra Harrington advocated for placing individuals on the “no-fly” list if the
individual has a confirmed diagnosis or high suspicion of a communicable disease, or if the indi-
vidual lived in, had traveled to, or was otherwise in contact with an area confirmed or suspected
of a communicable disease outbreak. Id.
245. This system would be integrated with the boarding check-in such that the airline would
be able to cross reference individuals flying on standby without pre-issued boarding passes.
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matched in the No-Fly Database, the airline is alerted and able to pre-
vent the passenger from boarding.  Unlike the airline companies’ cur-
rent system of checking for visible signs of illness,246 the database is a
verifiable method for determining whether the passenger is ill, such
that he should not be flying.
As Harington suggests, an individual will be removed from the
database when (1) a medical professional determines that the individ-
ual is no longer contagious and submits that data to the CDC for re-
moval from the database; or (2) the individual has been effectively
treated for communicable disease and can provide proof of such treat-
ment.247  The government’s model requires a public health official to
determine that the individual is no longer contagious;248 however, a
primary care provider could just as easily determine an individual is
no longer contagious.249  Therefore, a medical confirmation by a med-
ical professional will be sufficient for removal from the no-fly list.  A
“medical professional” means a physician holding a medical degree,
specialized in internal medicine,250 and having the requisite medical
license for the state in which the individual practices, or a nurse practi-
tioner holding a master’s degree in nursing and having the requisite
state license.  In order to receive a medical confirmation, the individ-
ual must visit a medical professional to receive a recommendation that
he is healthy to fly.  The medical professional will submit the recom-
mendation to the No-Fly Database for CDC review.  Once the CDC
confirms that the individual is healthy to fly, based on the medical
professional’s recommendation, the individual will be removed from
the No-Fly Database.  This process should also take no longer than
ten to twenty-four hours from the time the recommendation is submit-
ted to the CDC’s confirmation and the subsequent removal from the
system.  However, it may be reasonable to provide the medical profes-
sional the option to classify the recommendation as “urgent” under
certain circumstances.251  This clearly has great potential for abuse;
therefore, it should be used sparingly and only in extreme cases.
246. O’Leary, supra note 21, at 532. R
247. Harrington, supra note 49, at 313. R
248. Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
249. Infectious Disease Diagnosis, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-condi
tions/infectious-diseases/diagnosis-treatment/diagnosis/dxc-20168659 (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
250. Internal medicine physicians, generally thought of as “family doctors,” specialize in
preventing, treating, and diagnosing diseases that affect adults. About Internal Medicine, AM.
COLL. PHYSICIANS, https://www.acponline.org/about-acp/about-internal-medicine (last visited
Jan. 14, 2017).
251. Whether to mark a recommendation as “urgent” would be discretionary upon the medi-
cal professional’s judgment.
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Undoubtedly, the No-Fly Database will inconvenience some indi-
viduals,252 but the benefits to public health that will result from re-
stricting air travel to uninfected or noncontagious individuals
outweigh the temporary obstacles the No-Fly Database may create.
This No-Fly Database will effectively prevent infected individuals
from boarding the plane, thereby decreasing the risk of disease trans-
mission onboard.253
A realistic consequence of the No-Fly Database is that the travel
ban may deter individuals from seeking medical attention close to a
scheduled flight.  An individual who knows or should know that he is
infected with a communicable disease may not seek medical attention
to avoid being placed in the No-Fly Database.254  To prevent this from
occurring, if the infected individual boards an airplane and subse-
quently infects other passengers, then the infected individual should
be held civilly liable for any damages that result to the other
passengers.255
C. Indirect Regulation Through the Tort System to Prevent
Communicable Disease Transmission in Air Travel
“Public health authorities and private citizens possess powerful
means of indirect regulation through the tort system.”256  Civil litiga-
tion can redress many different kinds of public health harms; however,
it is important to remember that litigation is not an unmitigated
good.257  The tort system imposes economic burdens on both the indi-
vidual and the business.258  Litigation is costly for the individual and
252. Harrington, supra note 49, at 313.  Additionally, passengers living in rural areas without R
steady access to physicians may find it difficult to be treated prior to boarding the plane, such
that they are no longer contagious or to receive medical confirmation that he or she is healthy
enough to fly.  Further, lower income passengers, or passengers with limited insurance coverage,
may be financially burdened by the requirement that they seek medical attention for their conta-
gious communicable disease.  Although these individuals should be seeking medical attention
whether they can afford it since these diseases can be deadly if untreated.
253. Id. at 313.
254. See Major Garrett, Obama Fans Ebola Travel Fever, CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:00
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-fans-ebola-travel-ban-fever/.
255. To be sure, lower income passengers who travel while infected will be financially bur-
dened if they are held liable for infecting another passenger; however, that is the risk the in-
fected passenger runs when they fly while contagious.  The recoverable damages work as a
deterrent for flying while contagious and an incentive to seek medical treatment before flying.
256. Gostin, supra note 58, at 37. R
257. Id.
258. Id.
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drives up the cost of doing business.259  For example, from 2006 to
2008, companies paid average discovery costs of $621,880 on the low
end and $2,993,567 on the high end.260  Despite the economic burdens
the tort system places on litigants, infected individuals who transmit a
disease while aboard an aircraft should be liable for the damages to a
fellow passenger.  Realistically, this method for preventing transmis-
sion of communicable diseases should only be utilized when the plain-
tiff has suffered large damages from the disease.261  This Part analyzes
whether the individual who transmits the communicable disease may
be found liable for the damages incurred by a fellow passenger who
contracts the disease while aboard the aircraft.
1. Pursuing Individual Liability for Damage Arising Out of the
Disease Transmission
Plaintiffs may be inclined to hold the airline company liable for
their injuries because the airline company has deeper pockets and
owes a general duty to protect passengers from harm;262 however,
plaintiffs should pursue litigation against the ill passenger that spread
the communicable disease.  While airline companies owe a general
duty of reasonable care to protect their passengers,263 some factors
may not be within the airline’s control.  For example, it may not be
reasonably foreseeable264 to an airline that an individual will travel
while infected with a highly contagious disease despite governmental
warnings.265  In such a case, it may be fairer to sue the infected passen-
ger that transmitted the disease rather than it would be to sue the
airline.  Thus far, case law does not answer the question of whether
contracting a communicable disease during a flight constitutes an in-
259. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 4
(2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_major_
companies_0.pdf.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Establishing a threshold for damages may be necessary in order to prevent individuals
from bringing lawsuits to recover minimal damages.  However, this threshold may also en-
courage would-be defendants to fly because they know resulting damages will be too small for a
potential plaintiff to pass the threshold to successfully sue.
262. See Price v. Canadian Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464 (D.N.H. 2006); O’Leary, supra
note 21, at 532; Nemsick, supra note 194. R
263. See Bethel v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 348, 356 (1998).
264. Reasonably foreseeable risks are those “that a reasonable person would recognize while
exercising ‘such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other perti-
nent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would have.’”  David W. Barnes,
Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Precautions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357,
379 (1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
265. See infra notes 140–73 and accompanying text for the “tuberculosis traveler” story. R
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jury.266  This Comment advocates that passengers should pursue the
passenger who infected everyone, rather than the airline, to encourage
individuals not to travel while sick.
2. Liability for the Negligent Transmission of Communicable
Disease While Aboard an Aircraft
Given the hefty profits earned by airline companies,267 infected pas-
sengers may be more inclined to pursue litigation against the airline
rather than the individual.  However, infected passengers who negli-
gently transmit their diseases to fellow passengers should be responsi-
ble for the damages incurred by those who contract the disease.  The
infected passenger owes her fellow passengers a duty to prevent dis-
ease transmission while aboard the aircraft.  Some states recognize a
cause of action for intentional or negligent transmission of a commu-
nicable disease under (1) a general prima facie tort theory;268 (2) a
theory of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress;269
(3) a theory of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation;270 or (4) a negli-
gent communication of a communicable disease.271  This Comment ar-
gues that there should be a specific cause of action for negligent
transmission of communicable diseases while onboard an aircraft,
rather than relying on these varied causes of action.  This subpart fo-
cuses on establishing the elements for such cause of action.
3. Creating the Case for Negligent Transmission of Communicable
Disease
Negligent conduct is generally defined as the failure or omission to
act in a way as would a reasonably careful person, or acting in a way
266. O’Leary, supra note 21, at 532. R
267. See Hugo Martin, American Airlines Reports Record Profit, Again, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2015, 11:38 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-american-airlines-profits-20151023-story.
html; Anirban Chowdhury, IndiGo Announces 24% Increase in Quarterly Net Profit, Biggest
PBT in Ten-Year History, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016, 2:53 AM), http://articles.economic-
times.indiatimes.com/2016-01-22/news/69989512_1_aditya-ghosh-indigo-october-december.
268. Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679–80 (1993).  The elements for a prima facie tort theory
are the (1) the infliction of intentional harm, (2) solely to injure plaintiff without any excuse or
justification, (3) resulting in special economic damage which must be specifically pleaded, and
(4) by an act or series of acts that would otherwise be unlawful. Id.  A cause of action for a
prima facie tort likely would not be brought for transmission of a communicable disease while
flying.
269. Id.
270. Id.  Fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation may be a cause of action for a passenger infected
by another contagious passenger; however, it is typically a cause of action in HIV/AIDs lawsuits.
See Douglas Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 165, 175 (1987).
271. Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1984).
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that a reasonably careful person would not act under the circum-
stances, either of which causes an invasion of another’s interest.272
Further, negligence may be found where the individual failed “to take
a level of precautions commensurate with the likelihood and magni-
tude of the risk created by the individual’s conduct.”273  Essentially,
negligence refers to the individual’s conduct falling below the stan-
dard established for the protection of others against a reasonable risk
of harm.274  In the context of communicable diseases, these negligence
theories are applicable to individuals who carelessly expose others to
disease.275  In order to establish a cause of action for the negligent
transmission of a communicable disease, the plaintiff must establish
(1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual damages.276
In John B. v. Superior Court,277 a case of first impression, the Su-
preme Court of California noted the practical issues of imposing crim-
inal liability for exposure.278  Although John B. is a criminal case, the
court’s rationale for imposing liability for exposing another to a com-
municable disease exemplifies how and why civil liability should be
extended to the infected defendant.  In determining liability, the John
B court considered (1) what duty an infected individual has to avoid
transmitting the disease; (2) what level of awareness should be re-
quired; and (3) what responsibility the victim has to protect himself
against infection.279  In John B., both husband and wife were HIV
positive.280  The wife filed a lawsuit281 alleging that her husband was
infected first and that he knowingly transmitted the disease to her,282
while the husband conversely alleged that the wife infected him.283
The court relied on precedent established by other jurisdictions that
imposed liability on individuals who harmed others by transmitting
272. Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 243 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ill. 1968); Krivitski v. Cramlett,
704 N.E.2d 957, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
273. Needham v. White Labs., Inc., 847 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1988).
274. Getson v. Edifice Lounge, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983).
275. Baruch, supra note 270, at 174. R
276. James B. Damiano, Comment, Sexually Transmitted Diseases: A Courtroom Epidemic,
SETON HALL L. eREPOSITORY 7 (Jan. 1, 2012).
277. 137 P.3d 153 (Cal. 2006).
278. Id. at 159–60.




283. John B., 137 P.3d at 155.
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communicable diseases.284  The court found that “to be stricken with
disease through another’s negligence is in legal contemplation as it
often is in the seriousness of consequences, no different from being
struck with an automobile through another’s negligence.”285  There-
fore, the typical elements of a negligence claim286 apply when deciding
liability.  The court noted that other jurisdictions imposed liability
when the defendant acted not only negligently,287 but also when the
defendant had actual or constructive288 knowledge of a communicable
disease.289
The state of California maintained an overriding public policy of
preventing the spread of disease290 that would be enhanced by impos-
ing a duty of care on those who have reason to know they are in-
fected.291  Limiting liability to actual knowledge, the court stated,
would have “perverse effects on the spread the virus,” as people
would be incentivized to avoid diagnosis and therefore the potential
tort liability.292  The court further explained that “extending liability
to those with constructive knowledge of the disease. . . ‘will provide at
least a small incentive to other to use proper diagnostic techniques
and to alter behavior and procedures so as to limit the likelihood of
. . . transmission.’”293
a. Establishing the Duty of Care
Where there is no legal duty, there is no liability.  It is critical to
establish that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff before the
defendant may be found liable for acting negligently.294  This element
of the negligent transmission claim may be harder to establish; thus,
284. Id. at 159.
285. Id. (citing Billo v. Allegheny Steel Co., 195 A. 110, 115 (Pa. 1937)).
286. Damiano, supra note 276, at 7. R
287. John B., 137 P.3d at 159.
288. “[A]ctual knowledge . . . [is] ‘[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from con-
structive knowledge’ and . . . exists where a person sees something ‘first hand.’  Constructive
knowledge is knowledge that ‘one using reasonable care or diligence should have.’”  Christine L.
Eid, Comment, Lawyer Liability for Aiding and Abetting Squeeze-Outs, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1177, 1199 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (8th ed. 2004)).
289. John B., 137 P.3d at 160 (citing Deuschle v. Jobe, 30 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(“[A] person is liable if he knew or should have known that he was infected with a disease and
failed to disclose or warn his sexual partner.”).
290. Id. at 162 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120290 (2006)).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 161.
293. Id. (citing DONALD HERMANN, TORTS: PRIVATE LAWSUITS ABOUT AIDS, AIDS AND THE
LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 172 (1987)).
294. Eric Schulman, Sleeping with the Enemy: Combatting the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS
Through a Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 957, 968 (1996).
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this subpart provides an in-depth investigation on the ways in which a
duty may be established.  The notion of duty is founded on the idea
that every individual is responsible for exercising due care to avoid
unreasonable risks of harm to others.295  If the court finds the defen-
dant owed a duty to the plaintiff, then the law imposes on the defen-
dant an obligation to act with reasonable care towards the plaintiff.296
The determination of whether a duty is owed depends on a variety of
factors including:
1) the foreseeability, 2) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered
injury, 3) closeness of connection between defendant’s conduct and
injury suffered, 4) moral blame attached to defendant’s conduct, 5)
policy of preventing future harm, 6) extent of burden to defendant
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exer-
cise care with resulting liability for breach, and 7) availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.297
The reasonable foreseeability that an infected passenger will harm a
fellow traveler will likely be a major hurdle for any plaintiff to
overcome.
i. The reasonable foreseeability of negligent transmission
Unlike cases of negligent transmission of HIV/AIDS, in which the
duty element may be inferred from the nature of the sexual relation-
ship,298 such an inference is less obvious in the case of the negligent
transmission of tuberculosis, influenza, or any other airborne commu-
nicable disease.299  The foreseeability of transmitting the disease
strengthens the existence of a duty to prevent its transmission.300
A court may be more willing to find the infected passenger owed a
duty to the rest of the passengers, or at least to those in close proxim-
ity, if the likelihood that an infected passenger will transmit his com-
municable disease to another passenger is relatively high.301  The
likelihood of infection depends upon the nature of the risk and how
the disease is transmitted.302  The severity of the risk,303 the potential
295. Damiano, supra note 276, at 8. R
296. Schulman, supra note 294, at 969. R
297. Id. at 957 n.96.
298. Baruch, supra note 270, at 175. R
299. See id. (“In contrast to other communicable diseases such as tuberculosis or chicken pox,
AIDS is usually spread from victim to victim as the result of intimate sexual contract.”).
300. Schulman, supra note 294, at 970. R
301. See, e.g., Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the
plaintiff’s close proximity to inmates with serious contagious diseases satisfied the “imminent
danger” standard).
302. Sims, supra note 13, at 478.  For example, H1N1 influenza is an airborne disease transmit- R
ted through droplets expelled by an infected individual and inhaled by another. Seasonal Influ-
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magnitude of the harm,304 and the duration that the infected individ-
ual poses a risk305 all contribute to the likelihood that an infected pas-
senger will transmit his communicable disease.306  Last, the
probability that a disease will be transmitted should be considered
when determining the likelihood of infection.307  Therefore, whether a
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to not transmit a communicable
disease aboard the aircraft could vary depending upon the severity of
the illness.
Courts are more willing to find an occurrence foreseeable when
there is a special relationship in which a person entrusts themselves to
the protection of another.308  A plaintiff suing for the negligent trans-
mission of a communicable disease aboard an aircraft may encounter
some difficulties establishing a duty when the defendant is a mere
stranger;309 however, courts in many states have held that individuals
have a duty to warn in communicable disease cases.310
ii. The existing general duty to warn
In cases involving the knowing transmission of a communicable dis-
ease, the law is clear that an individual who knowingly exposes an-
other to a communicable disease is liable for damages.311  For
example, in the case Smith v. Baker, out of the Southern District of
New York, the court found the defendant liable for the negligent
transmission of whooping cough.312  In Baker, the defendant took his
enza and Influenza A (H1N1), W.H.O., http://www.who.int/ith/diseases/si_iAh1n1/en/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2017).
303. Sims, supra note 13, at 478.  For example, “[t]uberculosis is most contagious in confined R
areas with persons with whom extensive time is spent.” Id.
304. Id.
305. For example, individuals infected with H1N1 have a shorter contagion period than indi-
vidual infected with tuberculosis. Id.
306. Id. at 477–78.
307. Id. at 479.
308. Schulman, supra note 294, at 970. R
309. While DNA fingerprinting can identify the disease strain, it may be difficult for a plaintiff
to establish a special relationship if the defendant is simply a stranger on the airplane.
310. See Schulman, supra note 294, at n.107. R
311. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (holding defendant liable for the
negligent transmission of whooping cough); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632, 634 (Iowa 1885)
(finding hotel inn-keeper negligent for allowing guests to frequent hotel with knowledge of the
presence of smallpox); Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (ruling that
a person afflicted with typhoid fever has the duty to act in a manner which will not communicate
the disease, and to warn persons of the affliction if approached); Kliegel v. Aitken, 69 N.W. 67,
68 (Wis. 1896) (affirming an action for negligent transmission of typhoid fever and declaring that
individuals infected with smallpox who negligently expose another person to the disease, and
that person subsequently contracts the disease, are liable for damages).
312. Baker, 20 F. at 709–10.
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three children who were infected with contagious whooping cough to
the plaintiff’s boarding house thus exposing the plaintiff’s children to
whooping cough.313  The court found that the defendant failed to ex-
ercise due care in preventing the transmission of the whooping
cough.314  The existing caselaw could easily be extended to find that
infected individuals owe a duty to prevent the transmission of commu-
nicable diseases aboard aircrafts.
b. Establishing a Breach of the Duty of Care
Once the duty is established, the court must determine whether the
duty was breached.  A breach of the duty to prevent the transmission
of communicable diseases aboard an aircraft occurs the moment the
infected passenger boarded the plane.  Due to the ease with which
communicable diseases can spread throughout the cabin,315 it is al-
most inevitable that the infected passenger will transmit the disease.
Whether the transmission causes an injury to a fellow passenger is a
question of causation.
If the infected defendant boards the plane, knowing or suspecting316
that he is infected with a communicable disease, then the defendant’s
conduct breaches his or her duty to prevent the transmission of a com-
municable disease.317  Courts will generally find the defendant had
knowledge of the communicable disease, even without a medical diag-
nosis, if the defendant exhibited obvious symptoms.318  In such a case,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that he was infected
and disregarded the plaintiff’s welfare by exposing the plaintiff to the
disease.319
c. Transmission is the Proximate Cause of Plaintiff’s Injuries
Once the breach of duty is established, the plaintiff must show that
the breach was the proximate cause of her injuries.  If the defendant
breached his duty, but the breach was not the cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries, then the defendant is not responsible and the plain-
313. Id. at 709.
314. Id.
315. See Abeyratne, The Spread of Tuberculosis, supra note 34, at 56. R
316. Liability would not be extended to an individual that was unaware that he was infected at
the time they boarded the airplane.  Although the plaintiff would like to recover, the defendant
does not owe the plaintiff a duty to prevent the transmission.  Thus, the plaintiff cannot recover.
317. The defendant’s knowledge, or suspicion, may be a difficult hurdle to overcome; how-
ever, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as exhibited signs of illness.
318. Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 235–36 (La. 1994); M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645,
647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
319. Earle v. Kuklo, 98 A.2d 107, 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (holding the landlord
liable for failing to inform tenants that his family was infected with tuberculosis).
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tiff cannot recover from the defendant.320  Due to the ease at which a
communicable disease may spread throughout an aircraft, the defen-
dant’s presence on the airplane places the other passengers at an un-
reasonable risk for contracting the communicable disease.321
However, issues may arise in establishing that the defendant was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s contraction of the communicable
disease, especially when the communicable disease spreads through
the air.
The Restatement (Third) on Torts notes, “If the harms risked by . . .
[the defendant’s] tortious conduct include the general sort of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, the defendant is subject to liability for the
plaintiff’s harm.”322  Every time an infected individual boards an air-
plane, the risk of transmission to fellow passengers exists.323  There-
fore, a causal connection exists between the infected defendant
boarding the plane, the defendant spreading his disease via droplets in
the air, and the plaintiff contracting the disease.  It is important to
note that passengers, both infected and healthy, travel from the same
airport; thus, plaintiffs may find it difficult to establish that Passenger
A, rather than someone else within the airport, transmitted the dis-
ease which now afflicts the plaintiff.324  In any event, once the causal-
ity is established, damages may be assessed.
d. The Recoverable Damages
Damages can include medical costs, lost wages, and pain and suffer-
ing from exposure.325  The damages award may include the reasonable
cost or value of medical treatment, hospital care, and other related
320. Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of Standing, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2011) (“[C]ause in fact requirement in a Negligence claim is met if the
plaintiff can show a link between the defendant’s substandard or ‘negligent’ behavior . . .  and
the plaintiff’s injury or damages.”).
321. Abeyratne, International Responsibility, supra note 6, at 56. R
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON TORTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
323. Andrew Pavia, Germs on a Plane: Aircraft, International Travel, and the Global Spread of
Disease, J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Mar. 2007, at 621.
324. Establishing that the defendant transmitted the communicable disease to the plaintiff
would likely require examining medical records; however, if the defendant boarded the plane
while infected and contagious, he likely did not seek medical attention prior to flying.  In which
case, establishing causality may require disease DNA sequencing. See Using Genetic Tools to
Fight Viral Outbreaks, U. UTAH GENETIC SCI. LEARNING CTR., http://learn.genetics.utah.edu/
content/science/viruses/ (last visited July 6, 2016) (explaining that scientists can use DNA se-
quencing to trace viruses).
325. A defendant could potentially argue for the mitigation of damages through proof of vac-
cination, because it shows a commitment to protecting the health of the community.  Further, a
defendant could argue that a plaintiff was contributorily negligent by failing to receive vaccina-
tions, thus failing to protect herself from the obvious dangers posed by communicable diseases.
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expenses that are necessarily incurred as the result of the injury from
the time of the injury to the time of trial, as well as those expenses
reasonably certain to be incurred in the future.326  This cause of action
is reserved for plaintiffs that contract extreme cases of communicable
diseases, meaning plaintiffs cannot sue for contracting the flu or the
common cold.  Therefore, the plaintiff is likely to incur very expensive
medical bills due to the almost inevitable hospital stay, as well as high-
priced treatments and medicine to fight the illness.327
The damage award may include recovery for loss of earnings.328
“When a person is injured, the ‘cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune,’ and one the person is
not prepared to meet.”329  If a plaintiff was gainfully employed at the
time of the injury, and probably would have remained gainfully em-
ployed had he not been injured, then he may recover for the loss of
earnings equivalent to the value of his time.330  Therefore, a plaintiff
who successfully brings suit for the negligent transmission of a com-
municable disease aboard an aircraft could expect to recover for the
time that the he was rendered unable to work due to his injuries.
Further, a damages award may include recovery for the pain and
suffering experienced by the plaintiff,331 as well as for emotional dis-
tress arising out of the injury.332  Thus, a plaintiff injured by the negli-
gent transmission of a communicable disease aboard an aircraft could
recover for pain and suffering, as well as for the emotional distress,
experienced while infected with a communicable disease.
Due to the potential for devastation caused by communicable dis-
eases and the ease at which they can spread through air travel, it is
crucial that passengers do their part to prevent the spread of commu-
nicable diseases.  It is the responsibility of each and every individual
to act reasonably when they know or should know that they may be
326. Day v. S. Line Equip. Co., 551 So. 2d 774, 788 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 553 So.
2d 474 (La. 1989); Ex parte Hicks, 537 So. 2d 486, 489–90 (Ala. 1988).
327. See, e.g., Marks et al., supra note 164, at 818. R
328. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 423 n.10 (2009) (“[A] court may take steps
to ensure that any award of damages for lost wages . . . is offset by the amount of lost wages
awarded as part of a recovery.”).
329. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986) (citing Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
330. Simon v. Ciancio, 475 P.2d 343, (Colo. App. 1970) (stating that plaintiff’s testimony that
his earnings averaged between $1,000 to $1,500 per month at the time he was injured and that he
was unable to work for almost two months was sufficient to show his lost earnings).
331. See Seagers v. Pailet, 656 So. 2d 700, 703 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating the jury awarded
the plaintiff $54,179.58 for pain and suffering).
332. Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)
(“[R]ecovery may be had in a tort action for emotional distress arising out of negligent
conduct.”).
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infected with a communicable disease.  Individuals should be held lia-
ble when they negligently transmit a communicable disease while
aboard an aircraft.  Further, replacing the federal DNB list with the
proposed No-Fly Database will effectively prevent individual infected
with contagious communicable diseases from boarding airplanes and
placing fellow passengers at risk of infection.  Both proposals will im-
pact the passengers, airlines, and government in different ways.
IV. IMPACT
While communicable disease outbreaks facilitated by air travel may
seem isolated, the incidents of such outbreaks are easily recounted.
As highlighted in Part III.A,333 the 2003 SARS outbreak began when
a Chinese doctor transmitted the disease to fellow airline passengers
and ultimately infected a reported 2223 individuals in eighteen coun-
tries.334  More recently, in April 2015, a woman flew from India to
Chicago, Illinois while infected with a highly drug resistant form of
tuberculosis.335  Thankfully, there were no reported incidents of dis-
ease transmission.  The most memorable incident is the tuberculosis
traveler of May 2007.336  Against medical advice and the requests
from the CDC, Mr. Speaker, while infected with a rare, highly drug-
resistant form of tuberculosis, flew on multiple international flights.337
The tuberculosis traveler incident prompted public outcry against Mr.
Speaker for disregarding the warning of health officials and placing
fellow passengers in danger of contracting the deadly communicable
disease.338
“Over the last forty years, the emphasis of American culture has
shifted from social obligation and economic fairness to individual free-
dom, self-reliance, and personal responsibility, thus relocating health
from the public sphere to the private realm.”339  This individualistic
approach to air travel can cause catastrophic consequences.  There-
fore, regulation of infected individuals’ conduct through the No-Fly
Database and through tort liability is necessary to reduce the number
of individuals who contract a communicable disease.  This Part ad-
dresses the advantages and hurdles for implementation of the pro-
333. See supra notes 133–73 and accompanying text. R
334. Abeyratne, International Responsibility, supra note 6, at 57–58. R
335. Grady, supra note 148. R
336. U.S. Steps Up Precautions over TB, supra note 151. R
337. Id.; see also Conant, supra note 152. R
338. Harrington, supra note 49, at 296. R
339. Gostin, supra note 58, at 41. R
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posed No-Fly Database and the creation of a cause of action for the
negligent spread of communicable disease.
A. The Proposed Solutions Will Prevent Disease Transmission
Aboard Aircrafts
The proposed solutions described in Part III will shift the view of
public health from an individualistic perspective back to a social obli-
gation.  People are willing to travel while infected with a communica-
ble disease,340 even one that is extremely rare and highly contagious,
because individuals inherently act out of self-interest341 rather than
the common good.  The Communicable Disease No-Fly Database and
a cause of action for the negligent transmission of a communicable
diseases aboard an aircraft are necessary to protect the health and
welfare of fellow passengers on aircrafts, as well as people around the
world.
1. An Important Inconvenience: The No-Fly Database
Public health has a broad appeal because it is a universal aspiration;
however, what best serves the population may not always best serve
each individual’s interests.342  The No-Fly Database will likely incon-
venience some individuals.  For example, a person may be restricted
from important travel for work or personal reasons, or an individual
may be misdiagnosed with a disease that she does not have.343  De-
spite these individual considerations, the public health benefits cre-
ated by restricting air travel to uninfected or non-contagious
individuals outweigh any temporary obstacle the database may create
for some.
While the United States already has an established DNB list, the
mechanisms for preventing infected individuals from boarding air-
crafts are insufficient.  The proposed No-Fly Database will effectively
prevent infected individuals from boarding the plane, thereby decreas-
ing the risk of transmission onboard.344  For example, had the pro-
posed No-Fly Database existed when the tuberculosis traveler
checked-in for his flight to Italy, he would have been prevented from
340. See, e.g., Exclusive: TB Patient Asks for Forgiveness But Defends Travel, supra note 155. R
See generally Grady, supra note 148; U.S. Steps Up Precautions over TB, supra note 151. R
341. Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Unmasking the Motives of the Good Samaritan,
SANTA CLARA U. MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS, Winter 1989, https://legacy.scu.edu/
ethics/publications/iie/v2n1/samaritan.html.
342. Gostin, supra note 58, at 6. R
343. Harrington, supra note 49, at 313. R
344. Id.
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flying until he was no longer contagious.345  The tuberculosis traveler
incident is a prime example of such insufficiency, and he proposed No-
Fly Database should be implemented to improve upon the existing
infrastructure.
The software upon which the No-Fly Database will function must
still be developed.346  The No-Fly Database raises health information
technology347 privacy concerns because it will contain confidential
medical information.348  To protect this confidential information, the
government must restrict access to the protected health information
contained in the Database, meaning only treating medical profession-
als have access.349  Such access would require an identification num-
ber and password to ensure secured access.  Further, the software
must incorporate sufficient safeguards and firewalls to prevent secur-
ity breaches.350  Routine monitoring of the No-Fly Database con-
ducted by the government will provide additional protection.351  If a
cybersecurity breach is identified, DHS is most prepared to investigate
the incident and coordinate a response.352  Currently, DHS’ National
Cybersecurity Protection System “provides intrusion, detection, ad-
345. The tuberculosis traveler incident occurred in May 2007 and the federal DNB was not
created until June 2007. See U.S. Steps Up Precautions over TB, supra note 151; see also Federal R
Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, supra note 83. R
346. The federal government would be responsible for the cost of developing the software
because it will be operating the No-Fly Database even though the federal government is severely
in debt. See Mike Patton, The U.S. Debt: Why It Will Continue to Rise, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2014,
6:24 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/09/18/the-u-s-debt-why-it-will-continue-
to-rise%20/#45c175405254.
347. Health information technology is the exchange of health information in the electronic
environment. Health Information Technology, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/health-information-technology/index.html
(last updated Nov. 6, 2015).
348. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE AND ELEC-
TRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT: INTRODUCTION 1
(2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/healthit/
introduction.pdf.
349. HHS promulgated tips for improving the cybersecurity of health care data. See generally
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOP 10 TIPS FOR CYBERSECURITY IN HEALTH CARE
(2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/Top_10_Tips_for_Cybersecurity.pdf.
350. Id.  The Department of Homeland Security operates the Network Security Deployment
division to improve cybersecurity within the federal government. See Securing Federal Net-
works, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/topic/securing-federal-networks
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
351. The CDC currently “reviews the records of all people on the DNB list every two weeks
to check whether they can be removed.”  Questions and Answers About the Federal Register
Notice, supra note 16.  Therefore, it should be relatively simple to add routine monitoring of the R
cybersecurity infrastructure.
352. See Cybersecurity, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/topic/cyber-
security (last visited Mar. 20, 2017), see also Cyber Incident Response, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/cyber-incident-response (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
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vanced analytics, information sharing, and intrusion prevention capa-
bilities that combat and mitigate cyber threats to the Federal
Executive Branch information and networks.”353  This system could
provide insights into the health data hacking, such that the Depart-
ment could form an appropriate response to the intrusion.
a. Privacy Concerns Related to the No-Fly Database
Passengers may be concerned about who has access to their pro-
tected health information.354  The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), enacted in 1996, guards against the dis-
closure of protected health information.355  The HIPAA legislation
states that the reporting of communicable diseases to local or state
health officials is exempt if the reporting is mandated within the state
code and utilized for the surveillance and prevention of communicable
diseases.356  For example, the information collected by state health of-
ficials and submitted to the NNDSS for surveillance and monitoring is
exempt from HIPAA regulations.
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows for the disclosure of protected
health information (PHI) to “business associates.”357  Business associ-
ates create, receive, maintain, or transmit protected health informa-
tion.358  Airlines with access to the No-Fly Database will be
considered business associates of the federal government because the
airline companies will receive the PHI of its passengers.  Further, the
business associates must not use or disclose any PHI,359 and they must
comply with HIPAA regulations unless the business associate is will-
ing to pay a penalty for violating the act;360 therefore, passengers need
not worry that the airlines will disclose their PHI.
The No-Fly Database may deter individuals from seeking medical
attention close to a scheduled flight because the individual does not
want their physician to place him in the No-Fly Database.  By placing
the patient in the No-Fly Database against the patient’s wishes, the
353. Securing Federal Networks, supra note 350. R
354. Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).
355. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
356. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b) (2016); see also Communicable Disease Reporting in Michigan,
MICH. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/0,5885,7-339-
71550_5104_31274-12538—,00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
357. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e)(1), 164.504(e)(1), 164.532(d)–(e) (2016); Business Associates,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/gui
dance/business-associates/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
358. Business Associates, supra note 357. R
359. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2) (2016).
360. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-4\DPL405.txt unknown Seq: 44 21-SEP-17 7:20
1124 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1081
doctor values public interest over the patient’s interests.  This change
in the doctor-patient relationship could subvert its foundation.  Physi-
cians owe a duty to their patients to keep medical and patient infor-
mation confidential.361  Thus, “[p]atients have developed a reasonable
expectation that their medical information will not be disclosed with-
out their consent by their physicians.”362  Because physicians would be
required to disclose to the No-Fly Database that a patient is infected
with a communicable disease, patients may no longer trust their physi-
cians with sensitive, confidential health information, thereby decreas-
ing the physician’s ability to properly treat the patient.363  The quality
of health care diminishes when physicians cannot provide adequate
treatment.364  This relationship can remain intact because the quantity
of information disclosed and access to such information is limited.
Only the patient’s identity and diagnostic information will be en-
tered into the Database. For example, if an individual is diagnosed
with drug-resistant tuberculosis, then the doctor will enter the individ-
ual’s name, date of birth, perhaps a social security number, and that
the individual has drug-resistant tuberculosis.  Only the CDC has full
access to the submitted patient information, whereas airline staff will
only see the identifying information, such as name, date of birth or
perhaps a social security number, and that the individual is restricted
from flying.  The actual diagnosis will not be disclosed to airline staff.
This will help to reduce the stigmatization of the passenger since fewer
people, especially those without a medical interest, as opposed to a
physician or the CDC who do have such an interest, will know the
individual’s private medical information.365
361. See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 535 (Or. 1985) (“A physician’s
duty to keep medical and related information about a patient in confidence is beyond ques-
tion.”); see also David H. Thom et al., Measuring Patients’ Trust in Physicians When Assessing
Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2004, at 4, 124, 126 (“[T]hese relationships are
deeply personal and can be profoundly life-altering . . . the essential quality of these relation-
ships is a fundamental good worth pursuing.”).
362. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie A. Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a Federal
Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 551 (2004) (citing Alberts v. Devine, 479
N.E.2d 113, 118–19 (Mass. 1985) (“[C]onfidentiality of the [physician-patient] relationship is a
cardinal rule of the medical profession, faithfully adhered to in most cases, and thus has come to
be justifiably relied upon by patients seeking advice and treatment.”)).
363. See Jennifer Fong Ha, Doctor-Patient Communication: A Review, 10 OCHSNER J. 38, 38
(2010) (“A doctor’s . . . ability to gather information in order to facilitate accurate diagnosis,
counsel appropriately, give therapeutic instructions, and establish caring relationships with pa-
tients . . . the ultimate goal . . . [is] achieving the best outcome and patient satisfaction, which are
essential for the effective delivery of health care.”).
364. Id.
365. The hope is that the passenger will not feel as though “everyone knows” that he is in-
fected.  Rather, it will be like any other situation in which only those will the need to know about
the diagnosis, such as the doctor, CDC, or employer, are informed.
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b. Procedural Due Process Implications
Placement on the No-Fly Database raises constitutional issues re-
garding an individual’s right to travel.366  However, as the Court in
Jacobson noted, the state may infringe on individual rights when the
health concerns of the larger community are at stake.367  Further,
placement in the No-Fly Database raises due process implications be-
cause an individual has been deprived of the constitutional right to
travel without procedural due process.368  “Government and private
actors, however, may effect the intentional deprivations of property or
liberty . . . [But] [o]ur legal system requires process for many such
losses,”369 meaning an individual must be provided notice and the op-
portunity to be heard.370
To avoid unconstitutionally depriving individuals placed in the No-
Fly Database of their right to travel, the CDC should provide proce-
dural due process to redress placement in the No-Fly Database.371
The treating medical professional who diagnoses the individual should
first inform the individual that he is being placed in the Database.
Not only will this improve the doctor-patient relationship, such that
the patient may feel less as though the doctor betrayed him by placing
him in the Database behind the patient’s back, but it will provide ad-
vance notice to the individual that he will be restricted from flying.
Once the CDC receives the identifying information and diagnostic in-
formation, the CDC must provide prompt formal notice to the indi-
vidual explaining why the individual’s freedom to travel is
restricted.372  Such notice would also provide the individual with the
opportunity to contest their inclusion on the Database.
366. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1998).
367. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
368. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1163 (D. Or. 2014) (finding that DHS’ process
for placing individuals on the terrorist no-fly list deprived plaintiff of his constitutional right to
travel without procedural due process); see also Edward Rubin, Due Process and the Administra-
tive State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1045 (Dec. 1984) (“[P]rocedural protection must be triggered
by some underlying ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ right.”).
369. Ann Woolhandler, Procedural Due Process Liberty Interests, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
811, 817 (Summer 2016).
370. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); see also Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293,
1296 (D. Or. 2013) (alleging that the Department of Homeland Security violated plaintiff’s right
to due process by failing to provide either post deprivation notice or any meaningful opportunity
to contest their continued inclusion on the terrorist no-fly list).
371. Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting the government revised
its redress procedures as a result of Latif).
372. This would best be done through a written letter mailed to the patient.  Notice by publi-
cation, which is satisfactory under some circumstances, see Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950), would not be appropriate here because notice by publica-
tion would likely disclose PHI and cause social stigmatization.
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c. The Impact to Airline Company Profits
Additionally, airlines may fear the proposed No-Fly Database will
cause business losses due to cancelled flights and requests for reim-
bursement for denied boarding.  One of the primary goals for busi-
nesses is to maximize profits.373  This goal is no different for the
airlines.374  Airplanes are expensive, fuel is costly, and it is difficult to
predict how many passengers will fly each year.375  Thus, throughout
the decades, many airline companies have gone bankrupt376 or out of
business.377
“The airline industry is vulnerable to global events,”378 such as po-
litical disruptions and disease outbreaks.  In fact, airline profits tend to
plummet during communicable disease outbreaks.379  For example, af-
ter the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, the
airline industry lost a reported $13 billion.380  More relevant to the
issue at hand, North American airlines lost approximately $1 billion
during the 2003 SARS outbreak,381 while Asian-Pacific carriers lost
approximately $6 billion.382  More recently, in reaction to news of the
first Ebola case in the United States in September of 2014, the share
373. Neil Skaggs, Profit Maximization, ILL. ST. U. DEP’T ECONOMICS, http://econom-
ics.illinoisstate.edu/ntskaggs/readings/maximization.shtml (last visited Jan. 4, 2017) (“[I]n many
industries, profit maximization is not simply a potential goal; it’s the only feasible goal, given the
desire of other businesspeople to drive their competitors out of business.”).
374. Caitlin Kenney, Why Airlines Keep Going Bankrupt, NPR (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:18 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2011/12/16/143765367/why-airlines-keep-going-bankrupt.
375. Id.
376. U.S. Bankruptcies and Services Cessations, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://airlines.org/data/u-
s-bankruptcies-and-services-cessations/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
377. See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (And Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
381, 383 n.4 (2002) (“[M]ore small carriers have been driven out of business than the number
still in the air.”). See generally Defunct Bankrupt Airlines from Around the World – The Most
Recent US Airlines Filing Bankruptcy, AVIATION EXPLORER, http://www.aviationexplorer.com/
defunct_airlines_worldwide.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
378. Teresa Cederholm, Must-Know: SARS’ Impact on the Airline Industry, MKT. REALIST
(Oct. 20, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/10/must-know-sars-impact-airline-indus-
try/; Teresa Cederholm, Why Fatal Disease Outbreaks Impact Economic Activity, MKT. REALIST
(Oct. 20, 2014, 3:48 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/10/why-fatal-disease-outbreaks-impact-
economic-activity/ [hereinafter Cederholm, Why Fatal Disease Outbreaks Impact Economic Ac-
tivity] (noting airline stocks are sensitive to changes in economic conditions).
379. Sharon Begley, Flu-Conomics: The Next Pandemic Could Trigger Global Recession,
REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-reutersmagazine-davos-flu-
economy-idUSBRE90K0F820130121.
380. Teresa Cederholm, Why Political and Legal Factors Impact the Airline Industry, MKT.
REALIST (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/09/why-political-and-legal-fac
tors-impact-airline-industry/.
381. See Begley, supra note 379. R
382. Id.
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prices of major U.S. airlines dropped substantially—an average of
17% among the airlines.383  Further, airlines tend to lose profits dur-
ing disease outbreaks because passengers rightly fear the possibility of
disease transmission through air travel.384  “Travelers may choose to
postpone their travels because . . . of concerns about their health.”385
Thus, airlines have a vested interest in preventing disease outbreaks.
2. Returning to Solidarity: Individual Liability for the Negligent
Spread of Communicable Disease
The well-being of society depends upon individuals, when infected
with a contagious communicable disease, acting responsibly with the
common good in mind.  Individuals who cannot meet this standard of
care should be held liable for the damages that result.  If the No-Fly
Database does not prevent an individual infected with a communica-
ble disease from boarding a plane, tort liability serves as a second
method of prevention.  An individual, who knows or should know that
he is infected with a communicable disease, may not seek medical at-
tention in order to avoid being placed in the No-Fly Database.  In
such event, if the infected individual boards an airplane and subse-
quently infects other passengers, then the infected individual should
be held liable for the damages that result to fellow passengers.
a. Difficulties in Identifying the Defendant
Practical limitations exist for imposing tort liability on the disease
transmitter, such as the potential difficultly identifying the defendant.
Unless passengers exchange contact information while aboard the air-
craft, the plaintiff like will be unable to identify the defendant.  Air-
lines are required by regulation to keep flight manifests
confidential.386  The passenger information contained on the manifest
may only be disclosed to the U.S. Department of State, the National
Transportation Safety Board, and the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion.387  Although confidential, flight manifests have been found dis-
383. Teresa Cederholm, Why the Ebola Scare Led to a 16% Drop in the Airline Index, MKT.
REALIST (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/10/why-ebola-scare-led-to-a-16-
drop-in-airline-index/.  These airlines include Delta, Southwest, American, Jetblue, United, and
Alaska. Id.
384. Cederholm, Why Fatal Disease Outbreaks Impact Economic Activity, supra note 378. R
385. Todd Wilson & Nicole Cohen, Conveyances & Transportation Issues: Perspectives: What
to Expect When Traveling During an International Outbreak, in THE YELLOW BOOK: CDC
HEALTH INFORMATION FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL (2016) (noting that disease outbreaks can
result in large decreases in travel volume).
386. 14 C.F.R. 243.9(c) (2016).
387. Id.
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coverable subject to a protective order.388  In Nathaniel v. American
Airlines, plaintiff brought suit against the airline for injuries allegedly
sustained from the airline’s failure to accommodate the plaintiff.  The
court, recognizing the plaintiff had no other means of obtaining the
passenger information to contact potential witnesses, granted discov-
ery of the flight manifest.389  Note, however, that the cases in which
flight manifests are discoverable, the airline was a party to the litiga-
tion.  Although the underlying rationale is similar here—that the
plaintiff likely would have no other means of identify and contacting
the individual who infected her—it is unknown whether a judge would
compel discovery of the flight manifest in civil litigation in which the
airline is not a party.
In the alternative, a plaintiff may have to go through public health
authorities to identify the defendant.  Public health authorities can ob-
tain contact information for passengers who fly while infected with a
communicable disease.390  A plaintiff could make public health au-
thorities aware that a communicable disease was transmitted to her
while flying and the authorities would investigate to identify the trans-
mitter.  However, the authorities may refuse to disclose identifying in-
formation to the plaintiff avoid a HIPAA violation.
The plaintiff may also attempt to identify the defendant via the
“DNA fingerprint” of the communicable disease.  Advances in science
allow for disease tracing of communicable disease, which can track
and confirm the spread of communicable disease.391  Disease tracing
identifies a disease case, determines its contacts, and compares the
genetic sequence of the identified case to its contacts.392  This allows
388. Wallman v. Tower Air, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 566, 569 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding adequate “jus-
tification within the discovery rules for producing the list” subject to a confidentiality agree-
ment); Delta Airlines v. Cook, 816 N.E.2d 448, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that
defendant’s passenger list was discoverable with limitation as to what use may be made of the
information); Nathaniel v. Am. Airlines, 2008 WL 5046848, at *7 (D.V.I. Nov. 20, 2008) (finding
the flight manifest discoverable subject to a protective order because the plaintiff had no other
means of obtaining the contact information of potential witnesses).
389. Nathaniel, 2008 WL 5046848, at *7.
390. Illig et al., supra note 4. R
391. Eugene Russo, Stalking Infectious Diseases, SCIENTIST (June 12, 2000), http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/12877/title/Stalking-Infectious-Disease/.  It is also impor-
tant to note that plaintiffs may not detect the disease immediately after the flight.  “Given the
long latency period between exposure and disease such cases [of tuberculosis transmission
aboard a plane] are unlikely to detected.”  Karen Marienau et al., Flight Related Tuberculosis
Contact Investigations in the United States: Comparative Risk and Economic Analysis of Alternate
Protocols, 12 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS DISEASE 54, 55 (2014).  Thus, disease DNA tracking
may become vital to determining the defendant.
392. BENJAMIN ARMBRUSTER & MARGARET BRANDEAU, STAN. U., THE COST-EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF CONTACT TRACING FOR ENDEMIC DISEASES (2007), http://users.iems.northwestern.edu/
~armbruster/2007AugUBC_poster.pdf.
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for the identification of different strains of a single virus or bacteria
and the tracking its trends.393  Disease tracing may be expensive,394
depending on who pays for it.395  Disease tracking is also  labor inten-
sive,396 but is highly likely to find infected people.397  The cost of se-
quencing a genome rapidly decreased in a matter of fifteen years.  In
2001, the National Human Genome Research Institute reported the
cost of sequencing a genome was over $100,000; yet, in 2015, the cost
is around $1,000.398  Although $1000 is significantly less money than
$100,000, it can still be too great a sum depending on the financial
stability of the plaintiff.  That said, if a plaintiff is willing to spend
thousands of dollars to sue for the contraction of a communicable dis-
ease,399 then $1000 to determine the identity of the defendant is a
mere drop in the bucket.  Despite its relative cost, disease DNA trac-
ing could demonstrate the causal connection between the defendant’s
negligence and the plaintiff’s contraction of the communicable
disease.
b. Liability Incentivizes Passengers to Consider the Public Good
Individuals should be held accountable for their harmful actions.
Tort liability for the negligent spread of communicable disease incen-
tivizes infected individuals to refrain from flying.  The United States is
a highly litigious society,400 and the creation of this cause of action
could potentially increase the already high volume of litigation.  How-
393. Outbreak Detection, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 15, 2013), http://
www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/outbreak-detection/index.html.
394. See Kris Wetterstrand, The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME
RES. INST. (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/; see also, Price List, COR-
NELL U. INST. BIOTECHNOLOGY, http://www.biotech.cornell.edu/brc/genomics/services/price-list
#overlay-context=brc/genomics-facility/next-generation-sequencing (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
395. If an individual pays for the sequencing, it could be considered a costly method for estab-
lishing causation.  Realistically, the plaintiff will bear the cost of DNA sequencing to overcome
the hurdle of identifying the defendant.
396. ARMBRUSTER & BRANDEAU, supra note 392. R
397. Id. Pulse-Net is a national laboratory network which utilizes DNA fingerprinting to de-
tect disease outbreaks. About Pulse-Net, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16,
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/index.html.  These laboratories use whole genome se-
quencing, a newer method of DNA fingerprinting, to provide the most accurate bacterial finger-
printing data possible today. Outbreak Detection, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/outbreak-detection/index.html.
398. Wetterstrand, supra note 394. R
399. Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Waters, Caseload Highlights: Estimating the Costs of
Civil Litigation, 20 NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. 1, 5 tbl.3 (2013).
400. Lawsuit Abuse Impact, U.S. CHAMBER COM. INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.in
stituteforlegalreform.com/issues/lawsuit-abuse-impact (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (claiming
America has an addiction to litigation).
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ever, individuals inherently wish to avoid being sued401 because law-
suits are time consuming,402 expensive,403 and emotionally
overwhelming.404  Therefore, these considerations will likely motivate
infected individuals to visit their doctor for treatment rather than risk
the potential liability.  The imposition of tort liability effectively
causes individuals to consider the public good rather than their own
self-interests while infected with a communicable disease.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to communicable diseases’ potential for devastation and the
ease at which they can spread through air travel,405 it is crucial that
passengers do their part to prevent the spread of communicable dis-
eases.  “The health of the public is a shared value.  Not only does each
individual have an interest in staying healthy but also all of together
share an interest in having a healthy population.”406
The federal DNB list must be replaced with the proposed No-Fly
Database.  The improvements the proposed No-Fly Database makes
to the existing DNB list will effectively prevent individual infected
with contagious communicable diseases from boarding airplanes and
placing fellow passengers at risk of infection.  It is the responsibility of
every individual to act reasonably when they know or should know
that they may be infected with a communicable disease; therefore, in-
dividuals should be held liable when they negligently transmit a com-
municable disease while aboard an aircraft.
The proposed No-Fly Database and the cause of action for the neg-
ligent transmission of a communicable disease aboard an aircraft will
shift the current view of public health as an individual freedom and
401. See William Boyd, The Law and Politics of Tort Reform: Justice and Democracy Forum:
The Law and Politics of Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 377, 412 (2003) (stating some doctors “express
incredible emotional upset when they become defendant in medical malpractice lawsuits.”); see
also Elaine Draper, Preventative Law by Corporate Professional Team Players: Liability and
Responsibility in the Work of Company Doctors, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 525, 552
(1999) (“Industry’s standard for labeling is stricter than OSHA’s, because companies don’t want
to be sued.”).
402. Curtis Karnow, Complexity in Litigation: A Differential Diagnosis, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1,
11 (2015) (“For surely costly time-consuming litigation is bad.”).
403. Corey Ciocchetti, Tricky Business: A Decision-making Framework for Legally Sound,
Ethically Suspect Business Tactics, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 83 (2013); Hanna-
ford-Agor & Waters, supra note 399, at 5 tbl.3. R
404. Sandra Tunajek, Dealing with Litigation Stress Syndrome, AM. ASSOC. NURSE ANESTHE-
SIOLOGIST NEWS BULL. (July 2007), https://www.aana.com/resources2/health-wellness/Docu
ments/nb_milestone_0707.pdf.
405. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 12, at 440; Relman, supra note 14, at 2, 22. R
406. Introduction: Ethical Theory and Public Health, supra note 20, at 20. R
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personal responsibility407 to a social obligation in which everyone has
a stake.  Peter Fonkwo, Resident Advisor for the United States
Agency for International Development project on Family Health and
HIV/AIDS in Cameroon,408 states:
Infectious diseases constitute a major problem for the world . . . .
No country can afford to remain aloof in the battle against [infec-
tious] diseases, especially given the potentially far-reaching and dev-
astating effects that they could have on the human race at large . . . .
Therefore, all stakeholders . . . must take the necessary bold steps
forward . . . .  We already know a lot of what we must do; we just
need to do it.  The future of the human race depends on our actions
today.409
While it would be naı¨ve to think law or medicine could create an envi-
ronment in which it is impossible for communicable diseases to spread
through air travel,410 it is possible to create an environment in which it
is not as easily spread.
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407. Gostin, supra note 58, at 41. R
408. African Health Specialists Gather in Washington, VOA NEWS (Oct. 29, 2009, 9:50 AM),
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409. Fonkwo, supra note 108, at S17. R
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